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ENERGY EXACTIONS
Jim Rossit & ChristopherSerkintt
Exactions are demands levied on residentialor commercial developers to force them, rather than a municipality, to
bear the costs of new infrastructure. Local governments commonly use them to address the burdens that growth places on
schools, transportation,water, and sewers. But exactions almost never address energy needs, even though local land use
decisions can createsignficant externalitiesfor the power grid
and for energy resources.
This Article proposes a novel reform to land use and energy law: "energy exactions"-understoodas localfees or timing limits aimed at addressing the energy impacts of new
residential or commercial development. Energy exactions
would force individual developers to internalize the costs of
growth on the energy grid, generate important information
about community energy needs and their externalities, decentralize risk-taking, promote technological change in new
sources of power supply, and stimulate usefulforms of regulatory competition between local communities and state utility
regulators. In the process, they would induce greaterenergy
conservationas new residentialand commercial buildings are
approvedfor development.
This Article defends the implementation of energy exactions by local governments. It then analyzes the potential legal hurdles energy exactions face, including their
authorization, preemption by state utility laws, and implications under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Energy exactions provide local governments a unique, pragmatic,
and valuable tool to integrate community values into energy
grid planning, promote demand reduction, and enable new
investments in low-carbon energy infrastructure.
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INTRODUCTION

New residential and commercial developments generate a
mix of benefits and burdens for municipalities. The benefits of
development typically include an expanded tax base, new
housing options, and economic growth more generally. But
new development can create costs as well, in the form of congestion and burdens on infrastructure. For example, schools,
water systems, sewers, roads and public transportation can
become overburdened and may need to be expanded or extended to meet increased demand.
Taxpayers are often asked to pay for new infrastructure
associated with growth, but an alternative solution is to force
developers to internalize more of the costs of each new project.
Many local governments use cost-shifting tools such as prespecified impact fees, concurrency requirements, and negotiated deals to force developers to pay for-or provide-new infrastructure to offset those burdens. Examples include schoolexpansions transportation improvements and the creation of
new public spaces, to name just a few.' Collectively, these
1 see JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 318-19 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing the ubiquitous
use of impact fees by local governments "to generate revenue for capital funding
necessitated by new development"); see also Growth ManagementPlanning-Con-
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tools are forms of "exactions"-demands levied on developers to
force them, instead of the municipality, to pay for the burdens
that their new projects impose. 2
But it is commonplace for new residential and commercial
projects to overlook an additional cost: the increased burden of
growth on energy infrastructure. Where energy supply is adequate to meet new demand, and development does not impact
power-distribution-grid reliability, the marginal impacts of new
development seem minimal. But energy demand growth eventually requires new supply. Building energy supply resources-or securing additional energy contracts-is costly.
Surprisingly, however, these kinds of system-wide customer
energy impacts are rarely considered as appropriate bases for
local government land-use exactions. 3 They should be. Resicurrency, 19 FLA. PRAC., FLORIDA REAL ESTATE

§

17:35 (2018 ed.) (defining concur-

&

&

rency); Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE 139, 143
(2005) ("The main reason municipalities impose impact fees on development is, of
course, to shift to the developer, the owner of the land converted to development,
or the consumers of the housing or other land use the costs of the public infrastructure that the development requires."); Mark Fenster, Takings Formalismand
Regulatory Formulas:Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV.
609, 615 (2004) (describing "exactions requiring necessary infrastructure" as an
"essential deal-making tool" for local land-use regulators); Robert H. Freilich
Neil M. Popowitz, How Local Governments Can Resolve Koontz's Prohibitionson Ad
Hoc Land Use Restrictions, 45 URB. LAW. 971, 983-84 (2013) (comparing concurrency requirements to other land-use tools); Jerold S. Kayden, National Land-Use
Planning in America Something Whose Time Has Never Come, 3 WASH. U. J.L.
POL'Y 445, 469 (2000) (labeling concurrency requirements one of the "key elements underlying typical state growth management laws"); Ronald H. Rosenberg,
The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with
Impact Fees, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 177, 206-10 (2006) (identifying reasons for the
"growing" use of impact fees by local governments); Jennifer Evans-Cowley, Development Exactions: Process and Planning Issues, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
Working Paper, at *4-5 (2006), http://www.impactfees.com/publications%20pdf
/evans-cowley-planning.pdf Ihttps: //perma.cc/TM79-8ZVQ] (describing forms of
exactions including dedication, tap fees, fee-in-lieu, linkage fees and impact fees).
See generally Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 605
(2013) ("Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their
conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained
such regulations against constitutional attack.")
2 See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 1, at 611 ("Exactions are the concessions
local governments require of property owners as conditions for the issuance of the
entitlements that enable the intensified use of real property.").
3 Cf. Rosenberg, supranote 1, at 182 n. 19 (listing public infrastructure costs
as including "schools, sewer, storm drainage, roads, water service, parks and
recreation and fire protection," which notably excludes energy). In a provocative
essay, Peter Byrne and Kathryn Zyla focus on the use of exactions to address
carbon emissions. See J. Peter Byrne & Kathryn A. Zyla, Climate Exactions, 75
MD. L. REv. 758, 758 (2016). This is a more far-reaching exaction that would
include, for example, vehicle miles traveled, building processes, food consumption, and so forth. See id. at 772. That breadth is interesting but also very
difficult to quantify, making exactions for carbon legally problematic. Focusing

646

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:643

dential and commercial developers are uniquely positioned to
address both the demand for and supply of energy, especially
(though not exclusively) in growing communities. Forcing developers to internalize the costs they impose on energy infrastructure would encourage them to incorporate greater energy
efficiency in their buildings ex ante. Recognizing local governments as central to discussions about future energy production and supply needs would produce valuable information for
energy planning and cost allocation, better diversify risk-taking
in new infrastructure investment, and create productive new
forms of regulatory competition between local communities
and state regulation of private utilities. 4
This Article argues that energy exactions are normatively
desirable, evaluates how they can help to improve both land
use and energy regulation, and assesses the legal implications
and limits of their use. As an operational matter, we are largely
agnostic about how a municipality can best implement land
use exactions. The appropriate approach will depend on the
contours of state law as well as dynamics in local housing and
property markets. Nevertheless, we detail two different forms
of energy exactions by way of example: one that imposes preset prices on anticipated kilowatt energy demand and one that
is more focused on how the timing of a development affects
energy infrastructure (so-called "concurrency"). 5 Both involve
exclusively on energy confines the legal analysis, while still creating a proposal
that would have a significant if indirect impact on carbon emissions and climate
change.
4
Though there is little discussion of energy regulation in the land-use literature, some place local governments at the front line in addressing climate change.
See, e.g., Har M. Osofsky, Rethinking the Geography of Local Climate Action:
Multilevel Network Participationin Metropolitan Regions, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 173,
175 ("As international climate change negotiations continue to fail to solve this
problem, a growing number of cities around the world play increasingly critical
roles in multilevel efforts to address climate change."); Heike Schroeder & Harriet
Bulkeley, Global Cities and the Governance of Climate Change: What is the Role of
Law in Cities?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 313, 314 (2009) (finding that cities play a
major role in producing and managing carbon emissions); Patricia E. Salkin, Can
You HearMe Up There?: Giving Voice to Local Communities Imperativefor Achieving Sustainability, 4 ENvrL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 256, 264 (2009) ("Local governments cannot and have not waited for the federal and state governments when it
comes to sustainability. Climate change is no different. By the close of 2008,
more than 900 mayors had signed onto the U.S. Conference of Mayors' Climate
Protection Agreement.") (footnote omitted). For discussion of the potential of local
land-use law in addressing water problems, see CRAIG ANrTHONY (TONY) ARNOLD, WET
GROwTH: SHOULD WATER LAw CONTROL LAND USE? 418-33 (2005).
5 See, e.g., Timothy S. Chapin, Local Governments as Policy Entrepreneurs:
Evaluating Florida's "Concurrency Experiment," 42 URB. AFF. REv. 505, 507,
519-27 (2007) (describing a range of concurrency programs); Robert M. Rhodes,
Florida Growth Management: Past, Present, Future, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 107,
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a municipality charging developers for the impact of increased
energy demand resulting from new development. Both also create an incentive for developers to include technologies and
building approaches that will minimize energy needs.
Energy exactions are a natural extension of current landuse regulation, so the central intuition should be immediately
familiar to anyone experienced with the development process. 6
Just as many land-use approvals today require developers to
mitigate the impact of a new residential or commercial project
on roads or other infrastructure, energy exactions would require developers to bear the costs associated with increases in
the demand for energy, or to demonstrate how they have mitigated them. Consider that many communities and new developments already make "net carbon zero" claims as a way of
marketing growth projects. 7 Our energy exaction proposal
would require developers to back up these kinds of claims with
enforceable commitments or else pay for any anticipated burden on energy infrastructure. 8
Energy exactions would also improve energy law by filling a
gap in the current approaches to utility planning. In effect,
existing energy law encourages most local communities to "outsource" their energy supply decisions to private utilities. 9
119 (2007) (criticizing concurrency as creating additional "roadblocks" to
development).
6 For some of the literature describing land-use exactions, see supra note 1.
7
See, e.g., Frank Jossi, Three MinnesotaSites PlanFutureNet Zero Neighborhoods, ENERGY NEWS NEwoRK (Aug. 25, 2016), https://energynews.us/2016/08/
25/midwest/three-minnesota-sites-plan-future-net-zero-neighborhoods/ [https:
//perma.cc/S9DH-6NH3] (describing three new development sites in Minnesota
that anticipate a net-zero future); Net-Zero in Canada, 28 ENERGY DESIGN UPDATE
No. 9, at 7 (outlining plans for "net-zero-energy" developments and demonstration
houses); YourHub.com & Austin Briggs, Geos Development Neighborhood in
Arvada Claims Net-Zero Sustainability, DENVER POST (Sept. 30, 2014, 8:15 AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/2014/09/30/geos-development-neighborhood-inarvada-claims-net-zero-sustainability/
[https://perma.cc/UU3J-WBYG]
(describing the Geos Community, which will be the largest net-zero community in
North America).
8 Developers and local governments could also commoditize these impacts in
ways that recognize their low-carbon attributes, potentially even trading them in
regulated "allowance" markets as well as in more voluntary carbon offset markets.
See VANESSA RAULAND & PETER NEWMAN, DECARBONISING CITIES 109-12 (2015) (dis-

cussing carbon offsets and their role for carbon-neutral communities). Some
cities already sell carbon offsets produced from other investments, such as greenspace. See California City Eyes Carbon Credit Revenue from its Trees, REUTERS
(Aug. 15, 2012, 5:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-carbon
/california-city-eyes-carbon-credit-revenue-from-its-trees-idUSBRE87EOAZ2012
0815 [https://perma.cc/U65P-UMF3].
9 See Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 306 (2017)
(describing a municipal government decision to forgo public ownership and control of energy supply as a form of "outsourcing" to a private utility).
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State-centered utility planning and rate settinglo typically approaches the need for power supply based on a utility's anticipated growth in total energy demand." During times of
economic expansion, this traditional approach helped spread
costs to build out energy infrastructure. At the same time,
however, ignoring the incremental burdens of land use in energy planning gives private utilities little incentive to address
demand reduction, or to encourage others to make investments
or take on the risks of new power supply.1 2 Faced with the
prospects of global climate change, limits on fossil fuels, and
slow deployment of renewables, the current system makes little
sense.' 3 It is often far better and cheaper to slow the growth in
customer demand for energy than to speed up investments in
utility-owned power supply.14
One traditional way for a local community to address these
concerns is to "municipalize" its energy system by taking public
ownership of the power distribution grid.' 5 Historically, municipal ownership of electric power supply (often called "public
power") appealed to communities because it was considered
more rational and efficient than outsourcing energy needs to a
10 For general discussion of this conventional approach, see EDWARD KAHN,
ELECTRIC UTILITY: PLANNING AND REGULATION 88 (2d ed. 1991), http://aceee.org/

sites/default/files/publications/ebook/electric-utility-planning-and-regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/W86G-MNX2]. See also discussion infra subpart II.B
(discussing informational benefits that regulators and markets receive).
Since the time of Samuel Insull, state public utility regulators planning for
11
new energy-supply infrastructure have focused primarily on identifying powersupply resources to meet a utility's forecasted customer demand "load," with
particular attention to the total amount of power necessary to meet peak customer usage. See THOMAS P. HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY 218-26 (1983); JOHN L. NEUFELD, SELLING POWER: ECONOMICS, POLICY,
AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES BEFORE 1940, at 73-95 (2016); HAROLD PLATT, THE ELECTRIC
CITY: ENERGY AND THE GROWTH OF THE CHICAGO AREA, 1880-1930, at 95-124 (1991).

12 Utilities, of course, are in the business of selling energy, and despite episodic efforts to incentivize conservation their business flourishes by meeting everincreasing demand. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad
for Us: The Financial Disincentivefor Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1527, 1547 (2012).

&

13 For a discussion of leading climate science, see Christopher Serkin
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Prospective Grandfathering:Anticipating the Energy
TransitionProblem, 102 MINN. L. REv. 1019, 1026-29 (2018).

14

Cf. Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Supply and Demand- Barriers to a New

Energy Future, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1447, 1448 (2012) ("Although scholarship and

policy tend to focus on improving and increasing renewable energy supply, it is
difficult to envision how widely accepted carbon targets can be met, as well as
other goals such as energy security, without bending the growth curve of energy
demand.").
15 See Welton, supra note 9, at 304-08 (discussing how municipalization
presents a fertile opportunity for local governments to address climate concerns).
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private utility. 16 Even in those instances where local citizens
have expressed some political will to municipalize, securing
public ownership of a power grid is difficult. It typically involves eminent domain and requires a city to incur significant
debt; it also triggers burdensome state regulatory procedures.1 7 Energy exactions provide a powerful tool for a local
government to address energy demand and energy supply immediately, regardless of whether its citizens decide to take the
more dramatic and costly step of public ownership.
While this Article is the first to propose and defend energy
exactions by local governments, it certainly is not new to recognize how exactions force developers to internalize more broadly
the costs development poses for a wide array of harms." Other
scholars have proposed impact fees to offset environmental
burdens, like the destruction of wetlands.' 9 And in an insightful and important recent essay, Professors Peter Byrne
and Kathryn Zyla defend "climate exactions" as a way of pricing
carbon emissions resulting from new development. 2 0 Byrne
and Zyla advocate setting a price for carbon and charging it to
16 See Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins of PoliticalElectricity:Market Failure
or Political Opportunism?, 17 ENERGY L.J. 59, 67-68 (1996) (observing how many
large energy projects that could not be financed privately could be financed
through municipal ownership); William M. Emmons III, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Electric Utilities, and the Power of Competition, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 880, 887, 900

(1993) (describing how public ownership provided a form of "yardstick" competition that benefitted consumers); William J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, Property
Rights Versus Public Spirit: Ownership and Efficiency of U.S. Electric UtilitiesPrior
to Rate-of-Return Regulation, 73 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 414, 414, 419 (1991)

(finding higher productive efficiency for public ownership of electricity production
over private ownership); see also MASON WILLRICH, MODERNIZING AMERICA'S ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 47-84 (2017) (describing American experiences with public

ownership of electric utility monopolies by municipal, state, and federal governments, as well as customer cooperatives).

17

See Welton, supranote 9, at 289 (noting that in the 1990s, many commu-

nities considered municipalization but that the barriers "proved too substantial

for most localities" because of utility opposition along with a legal requirement
that cities help fund previously incurred infrastructure costs).
18 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 177; Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislatve Exactions and Progressive Property, 40 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 137, 137-38
(2016) (explaining how property owners must internalize development costs, such

as expected infrastructural, environmental, and social harms); see also Benjamin
S. Kingsley, Note, Making it Easy to Be Green: Using Impact Fees to Encourage
Green Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532, 549, 552 (2008) (providing methods of

making green buildings more cost effective).
19 See James C. Nicholas & Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Market Based
Approaches to EnvironmentalPreservation:To Environmental Mitigation Fees and
Beyond, 43 NAT. RES. J. 837, 858 (2003) (proposing the implementation of "envi-

ronmental linkage programs," which would combine impact fees with the principles of market-based regulation, in order to incentivize economical environmental
conservation).

20

See Byrne & Zyla, supra note 3, at 758.
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developers for the carbon footprint of the development as a
whole, including from cars and other indirect but predictable
carbon impacts. 2 1
Our energy exactions proposal is simultaneously more
targeted and more ambitious. Focusing on energy infrastructure-as opposed to wetlands degradation or carbon emission
more broadly-is consistent with traditional municipal exactions, which seek to offset burdens on other infrastructure. It
therefore does not require identifying and pricing environmental harms in the abstract, or monetizing the carbon impacts of
vehicle miles traveled resulting from a new development. 2 2 Our
proposal would therefore require less legal and legislative
change; indeed, municipalities in many states could adopt it
without any change in existing law. 2 3 Our proposal also goes
beyond addressing the environmental consequences of energy
demand, promising to reconfigure and rationalize utility planning and pricing more generally. In short, energy exactions are
a tool for moving towards a pricing of energy supply that approximates the full marginal cost of production (including social costs), for decentralizing risk in new energy infrastructure,
and for encouraging inter-governmental competition, while
also reducing customer energy demand.
Part I of this Article briefly describes how local governments currently employ land-use exactions as a tool to force
developers to internalize many of the costs of new residential or
commercial projects. It then contrasts this with traditional
utility-scale energy planning, which begins with customer demand estimates and then aims to build energy supply infrastructure to meet this load. In recent years, the sale of electric
power in bulk in interstate energy markets has grown in significance and many utility regulators have updated their power
planning approaches to be more "comprehensive" and "integrated." 2 4 Still, even in those areas where interstate power
See id. at 758-59.
A strength of the Byrne & Zyla approach is the breadth of the problem it
seeks to address. The transportation impacts of new development are a central
source of carbon emissions. Focusing on the power grid may ignore some of these
costs, though if transportation is electrified there could be considerable convergence between climate and energy exactions.
23
See infra subpart III.A.
24
For discussion of these trends and their origins, see RICHARD HIRSH, POWER
21

22

LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC
UTILITY SYSTEM 5-8, 233-34 (2002). Various state "integrated resource planning"

approaches are compiled at the Association of Energy Engineers PowerPortal. See
PowerPortal,ADVANCED ENERGY ECON., https://powersuite.aee.net/portal [https:/
/perma.cc/TFP2-LRHS] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
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markets routinely price dispatched energy, most state planning
approaches fail to recognize the potential of demand reduction
or conservation-important strategies that, if aggregated
across individual customers, could substantially reduce any
need for new sources of energy supply. 2 5 Nor do state utilityplanning decisions address how customer accretion and new
uses of energy, typically approved at the local level, strain existing energy supply. Rather, power supply impacts associated
with new customers are typically built into a utility's rate base,
effectively centralizing infrastructure investment decisions and
spreading their costs among all of a utility's residential or commercial customers, rather than specifically concentrating their
allocation on new customers or new uses.
Part II discusses how energy exactions or ideas such as
energy concurrency in land-use law can help to ensure that
new communities produce a diverse range of energy benefitsrather than relentlessly increasing energy supply without paying attention to who bears the costs or without achieving the
important benefits of easing demand. By forcing developers to
pay the full marginal costs to the energy system of new uses of
land, energy exactions can work to provide transparency and
standardization in evaluating the impacts on energy demand
and the environment-complementing other federal, state and
local initiatives, such as those designed to encourage alternative sources of supply or to pursue energy savings. Unlike
traditional approaches to utility planning, exactions would flip
the energy planning model from supply-follows-demand to
place the initial energy expansion burden on those who are
best positioned to integrate energy efficiency and conservation
measures into the design of communities. Energy exactions
will generate better information about customer energy use
and its alternatives, assisting regulators in achieving a better
match between the approval of new resources and each community's energy needs. Exactions will decentralize and better
diversify the risks of various energy supply decisions, encouraging communities themselves to invest in new forms of technological innovation. They also will promote beneficial forms of
25
For example, a 2016 report of load forecasting in western states concluded
that systematic overestimation of load growth occurred in utility planning decisions from 2000-2014, despite "integrated" planning approaches. See JUAN PABLO
CARvALLO ET AL., ERNEST ORIANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., LOAD FORECASING
IN ELECTRIC UTILITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING 39 (2016), https://emp.lbl.gov/

sites/all/files/lbnl-1006395.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FTR-HBA6].
discussion of these problems, see infra subpart II.B.

For further
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inter-governmental competition between state and local
regulators.
Part III evaluates the legal foundations and limits of energy
exactions, including their authorization under state law, the
extent to which they are vulnerable to intrastate preemption
under state utility laws, and the likelihood that they will survive challenges under the Takings Clause and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Along the way, we consider issues
of jurisdictional mismatch between local governments and the
utilities impacted by energy exactions, as well as concerns
about affordability. Initially, we show that state enabling or
impact fee legislation does not preclude local energy exactions
in most states and that, in those instances where it does, modest changes to statutes could enable local governments to address their energy needs. 26 Under intrastate preemption, state
utility regulation could also potentially be construed as limiting
the ability of local land-use regulators to impose new energy
charges. However, we show that, properly understood, state
utility laws' preemptive effects on local energy exactions are
limited to state utility-franchise restrictions on duplicative investment in infrastructure (already safeguarded by state laws
that provide an explicit regulatory procedure for municipalization of energy-distribution utilities) or those (rare) situations
where local imposition of an energy exaction would foreclose
utility investors' ability to recover state-approved costs. Intrastate preemption would not, we argue, preclude land-use regulators from imposing local charges on development for
purposes of energy demand reduction or to meet a need for
additional energy-supply resources.2 7
We also argue that, if considered in the land-use planning
process, nothing about energy exactions runs afoul of the constitutional requirement that an exaction have a nexus to a
legitimate public purpose, as required by Nolan v. Califomia
CoastalCommissior. 2 8 In addition, we maintain that as long as
energy exactions are roughly proportionate to the system-wide
marginal costs of new uses of land, including the impact on
customer energy demand, they meet the proportionality re-

See infra subpart III.A.
See infra subpart III.B.
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Cormm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987) (noting that
an "essential nexus" must exist between a legitimate state interest and a regulatory condition on approval of a residential demolition permit); see infra subpart
26
27
28

III.C.
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quirement of Dolan v. City of Tigard.2 9 Still, evaluating energy
exactions under these tests might prove helpful to steer some
energy exactions towards the kind of marginal social cost pricing that regulators typically emphasize in allocating the costs
of new energy infrastructure among customers.
Part IV concludes by summarizing the benefits of energy
exactions as a regulatory tool. In addition to producing better
information regarding the genuine energy impacts and opportunities associated with new uses of land, these benefits include decentralized investor risk in meeting future energy
needs and increased inter-governmental competition that can
create new forms of energy value. More widespread recognition
of energy exactions will help make urban growth and customer
demand central to the energy-planning process, allowing communities to better address the full costs and benefits of growth,
including problems related to energy grid reliability and climate
change.
I
THE EXISTING LANDSCAPE

Land use practice has evolved significantly since the widespread adoption of comprehensive zoning in the first half of the
twentieth century. What began as an exercise in anticipating
and planning for optimal development patterns has slowly
transformed into a regulatory framework based on deal-making
between developers and municipalities.3 0 Those deals typically
include developer concessions and even payments in exchange
for the municipality granting discretionary permits and zoning
changes either as part of ad hoc bargaining, or through more
formal legislated "prices" for different developments.3 1 This
Part sets out how this kind of deal-making is used today to
finance infrastructure improvements and then contrasts this
29 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (applying the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions to require "rough proportionality" between the condition's requirements and the impacts of development).
30 See Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a
Problem ofLocal Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 837, 848-51 (1983); see also Alejandro E. Camacho, Community Benefits Agreements: A Symptom, Not the Antidote, of
Bilateral Land Use Regulation, 78 BROOK. L. REv. 355, 356 (2013) (identifying
"larger movement throughout the United States away from the unilateral, government-dominated model of land use regulation and toward a more negotiated
paradigm"); Christopher Serkin & Gregg P. Macey, Post-Zoning:Alternative Forms
of Public Land Use Controls, 78 BROOK. L. REv. 305, 310-11 (2013) (describing
shift towards "dealing" model of land use regulation).
31
See Mulvaney, supra note 18, at 142-49 (contrasting legislated and ad hoc
exactions).
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practice with conventional regulatory decisions regarding energy supply infrastructure.
A.

Land Use Exactions

Zoning and land-use controls have become important tools
for financing municipal infrastructure. 3 2 For casual observers
of land use regulations, this might be surprising. Zoning, after
all, has traditionally focused on narrow goals: separating incompatible uses of land and planning for future growth.3 3 Today, however, sophisticated municipalities treat zoning
regulations, particularly discretionary approvals, as opportunities to compel developers to bear some of the public costs of
development. These demands, imposed as conditions for development, are referred to generally as exactions.3 4
According to Professor Vicki Been, exactions arose early in
the twentieth century in response to the failure of another financing mechanism for public improvements: special assessments.3 5 Prior to the 1930s, many municipalities would pay
for street paving and other kinds of infrastructure by levying
special assessments on affected property owners, allocating the
cost to those property owners specifically benefitted by the improvements.36 Following the economic upheavals of the 1920s
and 1930s, many municipalities found themselves unable to
recover the costs of their public improvements and were left
holding the proverbial bag. The early use of exactions addressed this risk by forcing private developers to pay for infrastructure improvements up front, as a condition of developing
32
See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 670 (4th ed. 2013)
(including development exactions in a chapter on infrastructure financing as part
of land use process).
33 Serkin & Macey, supra note 30, at 307 (describing origins of zoning).
34 See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a ConstitutionalShadow:
The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 730 n.7 (2007)
(defining "'exactions' to refer to all conditions on development, including the dedication of land, fees in lieu of dedication, or impact fees."); see also Rosenberg,
supra note 1, at 181 ("Increasingly, local governments combine their traditional
land use regulatory powers with their authority to impose land development conditions. This practice has become known as requiring 'exactions' as a condition of
land use approval . . .").
35 Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 CoLuVI. L. REv. 473, 479-80 (1991).
36 See id. at 479 (describing the origins of land use exactions); Rosenberg,
supra note 1, at 191-204 (describing the history of exactions). Assessments are
distinct from taxes because they are not borne by all property owners, but only by
property owners directly affected by the improvement. See Derek P. Cole, Comment, Special Assessment Law Under California's Proposition218 and the OnePerson, One-Vote Challenge, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 845, 852-53 (1998).
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their property.3 7 The use of exactions became more widespread with the popularization of subdivisions, and usually
took the form of dedications of land. Local governments, for
example, would allow private subdivisions only on the condition that the developer first build roads and sidewalks and
dedicate them to the public.38
Today, exactions are imposed in many different contexts
and result in various forms of developer-provided benefits. Exactions are no longer limited to subdivisions or to on-site dedications of property. 3 9 Applications for subdivision permits are
still a frequent source of exactions, but so too are requests for a
rezoning or a variance, all of which require the granting of
discretionary approvals. 4 0 And municipalities seek more than
just land. Today, exactions include fees in lieu of dedications of
land as well as impact fees for various adverse consequences of
development. 4 ' There are also different ways to impose exactions. Some arise through ad hoc bargaining between developers and municipal officials, while others are legislated as prespecified "prices" for different kinds of developments. 4 2
37 See Been, supra note 35, at 479; see also R. Marlin Smith, From Subdvision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage
Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 L. & CONTEMP.

PROBs. 5, 6 (1987) (describing history of exactions).
38 Been, supra note 35, at 479; see also Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds,
Exactions and Burden Distributionin Takings Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513,
1522-29 (2006) (describing the history of exactions).
39 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 37, at 7-9, 14-16 (describing rise of off-site
improvement requirements and cash payments).
40 See, e.g., James A. Kushner, Propertyand Mysticism: The Legality of Exactions as a Conditionfor Public Development Approval in the Time of the Rehnquist
Court, 8 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 53, 107 (1992) ("As a condition for discretionary
land use approval, communities typically impose exactions in the subdivision
process.").
41 See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 34, at 734 n.34 ('The term 'exactions' includes, among other types, the dedication of land for the siting of public services
or amenities (such as schools or parks), fees in lieu of dedication, impact fees to
fund the provision of public services, and linkages, off-site development impact
exactions intended to address effects linked to an approved development, such as
the increased need for affordable housing that might result from commercial and/
or office development."): see also Ball & Reynolds, supranote 38, at 1524 (describing the "revolution in exaction utilization [that] took place in the 1970s and
1980s") (quoting another source); Kushner, supra note 40, at 107-41 (describing
various forms of exactions).
42 See Mulvaney, supra note 18, at 138 ("There are two broad, source-based
categories of exactions: those imposed via case-by-case administration(consider a
permitting official determining in the course of an application review that a specific applicant must dedicate an identifiable portion of land before converting
tennis courts to condominiums) and those imposed via broadly applicable legislative formulas or schemes (consider a local ordinance requiring all developers to
replace every acre of wetlands they destroy with two acres of newly created wetlands).") (emphasis in original); see also Been, supra note 35, at 481 ("Local

656

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:643

Whatever their form, exactions can serve the important
goal of forcing developers to internalize burdens on the community created by a new project.4 3 While development can
increase the tax base and throw off economic and other benefits, it inevitably imposes costs on a municipality as well."
Most obviously, these include extending and maintaining infrastructure like roads, water, and wastewater. But costs also
include the added congestion of local services such as increased traffic, more students in public school, heavier burdens on emergency services, and so forth. Exactions therefore
often include fees or in-kind work by developers to upgrade
transportation infrastructure, to fund public school expansions, to build or finance an expansion of emergency services,
and even to pay for beautification where development negatively impacts an area's scenic beauty.4 5 If this all seems somewhat vague, two representative examples illustrate the
contexts in which exactions can arise and how they can be
either ad hoc or legislated in advance.
Today, many municipalities place significant amounts of
land into what are colloquially referred to as "holding zones."4 6
A holding zone does not reflect a specific zoning designation
but instead amounts to a restrictive limit on permissible usesoften exclusively agricultural or industrial uses-in places
where some other use is ultimately intended. 4 7 The point of a
governments impose exactions either according to a nondiscretionary, predetermined schedule, or through case-by-case negotiations."). A set formula is used to
impose the majority of exactions, although a significant percentage are imposed
through ad hoc bargaining. See id.

43

Mulvaney, supra note 18, at 137-38 ("Exactions . . . ostensibly oblige

property owners to internalize the costs of the expected infrastructural, environmental, and social harms resulting from development."); see also ROBERT H.
FREILICH & MICHAEL M. SHULTZ, MODEL SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS: PLANNING AND LAw 6

(2d ed. 1995) ("The concept of making development pay its own way now goes
beyond the mere dedication of parkland and school sites. It includes contribution
to the cost of providing all publicly produced benefits-roads, police and fire
services, medical services, water and sewer services, libraries, and more.").
44 Development can generate benefits as well, of course, and those benefits
may constrain the use of exactions if municipalities compete for certain kinds of
development. See, e.g., Been, supranote 35, at 509-10 (describing the sources of
competition that a community encounters after imposing exactions).
45 See supra note 1.
46 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planningan Affordable City,
101 IOwA L. REv. 91, 120 n. 132 (2015) ("[Clities have increasingly devoted land to
'holding zones,' or areas with no right to build, so that they can create conditions
on all building.").
47 See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free
Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 48 (1981) ("Especially in
the case of undeveloped land, zoning officials frequently employ low density holding zones to ensure their ability to exercise discretion over the project."); see also
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holding zone is that someone seeking to develop property there
will need to have it rezoned.4 A property owner is generally not
entitled to a rezoning as of right, however, but must petition the
local legislative body for the change. 4 9 That petition creates a
bargaining moment, where the developer and the local government negotiate the conditions for rezoning the property. Developers in this interaction are in effect supplicants to the local
legislature, and are often willing to pay to induce a rezoning so
long as the development is sufficiently valuable. 5 0 Some of
those conditions may restrict how the rezoned property will be
developed.5 1 Other conditions may involve building out infrastructure, constructing affordable housing, dedicating land to
the public, and even paying money into a municipal fund-in
short, paying for some of the burdens the development will
impose, to whatever extent the developer and municipality

Serkin & Macey, supra note 30, at 315 ("Some local governments adopt 'holding
zones' by, say, designating large swaths of land for agricultural use only.").
48
See 4 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAw § 78:35 (Rev. Ed.) (describing holding
zones as "designed to delay development for one reason or another . . . with the
understanding that, when conditions were right for development, the land could
be transferred into another and perhaps quite different zone.").
49
See, e.g., Fritz v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cty. Govt., 986 S.W.2d 456, 458
(Ky. Ct. App. 1998) ("[W]hen the legislative body denies the requested change, the
property owner must show the decision was 'arbitrary,' and whether an action is
arbitrary depends on whether the proponents of change can show '[n]o rational
connection between that action and the purpose for which the body's power to act
exists.'") (quoting City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Ky. 1971)).
But see Exec. 100, Inc. v. Martin Cty., 922 F.2d 1536, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991)
(identifying claims challenging government failure to rezone); Jack v. City of
Olathe, 781 P.2d 1069, 1075-77 (Kan. 1989) (subjecting failure to rezone to
traditional regulatory takings analysis); Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d
824, 826 (Tex. 1994) (same); see also Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The
State's Affinnative Duty to ProtectProperty, 113 MICH. L. REv. 345, 376-77 (2014)
(discussing cases involving requests for a rezoning).
50
See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 16 (2001) (describing developers in "homevoter" jurisdictions as "supplicants").
51 These restrictions, typically recorded as "restrictive declarations" in the
deed, may specify permissible uses, set aside some property as open space, and so
forth. See generally N.Y.C. BLDGS. DEP'T, BUILDINGS BULLETIN 2015-008, (Apr. 3,
2015), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/buildings/bldgsbulletins/bb_2015008.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WHT-25WM] (laying out procedures and requirements for restrictive declarations).
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agree. 52 This sort of ad hoc bargaining is a routine part of the
development process in many jurisdictions.53
For an example of legislated exactions, consider Citrus
Heights, California, which determines its fees according to a
straightforward calculation.54 Separate categories including
single-family residential dwellings, multi-family dwellings, and
commercial spaces are subject to different fees based on size. A
developer constructing a new single-family residence, for example, will have to pay nearly $1,500 in "road and transit
fees."55 Developers of commercial office space must pay .97<I
per square foot towards affordable housing, and $1,519 per
1,000 square feet towards a transportation mitigation program.5 6 Other common legislated exactions in other jurisdictions include fees for schools, wastewater, parks, and fire
departments, to name just a few.5 7 Whatever impact fees a
municipality imposes in this way, developers know ahead of
time the "price" of obtaining permission to build and can incorporate those costs into their planning.
52 See, e.g., Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359, 364 (Mass.
2003) (holding that a private power plant developer's voluntary offer to donate
money to town conditional on approval of its project did not invalidate rezoning):
Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 287 (N.J. 1990) (holding that
municipalities can impose reasonable fees on development of commercial residential property as inclusionary zoning measures to provide lower-income housing);
Redmond v. Kezner, 517 P.2d 625, 630 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (upholding the
validity of an agreement between property owners and a city in which the property
owners agreed to dedicate portions of their lands for a street system in return for
the city's rezoning their property for commercial use).
53
See Fenster, supra note 1, at 671 ("[N]egotiated land use decisions are an
essential aspect of contemporary local American governance . . . ."); Sean F.
Nolon, Bargainingfor Development Post-Koontz: How the Supreme Court Invaded
Local Government, 67 FIA. L. REv. 171, 192-96 (2015) (describing ad hoc
negotiations).
54
Development Impact Fees, City of Citrus Heights (August 2018), http://
www.citrusheights.net/DocumentCenter/View/ 105/Development-Impact-FeesBrochure-PDF?bidId= [https://perma.cc/3HD9-PJ4H].
55
56
57

Id.

Id.
See, e.g., Frona M. Powell, ChallengingAuthorityfor Municipal Subdivision
Exactions: The Ultra Vires Attack, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 635, 642 n.50 (1990) ("New
forms of exactions such as impact fees and linkage may finance not only traditional improvements, but nontraditional improvements and services such as child
day care, public art, historic artifacts, public transit systems, bookmobiles, jogging tracks, helicopter pads, recreational community gardening, job training, low
or moderate-income housing, library sites, and police and fire stations."); see also
Been, supra note 35, at 482 ("Recent nationwide surveys of recreational impact
fees for parks and playgrounds, for example, indicated that the fees charged for a
1500 square foot single family house ranged from $25 to $1800. A 1981 survey of
cities and counties in the San Francisco Bay region revealed that total impact fees
ranged from $23 to $4287 for single-family homes, and from $300 to $18,371 for
multifamily dwellings.") (citations omitted).
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Regardless of their specific form, exactions raise some
complex policy issues. For one, they allocate the public costs of
development to a community's newcomers instead of in-place
property owners.5 8 Typically, infrastructure improvements are
funded by the jurisdiction's tax base as a whole; exactions
impose those costs only on developers and therefore on consumers of new housing or new commercial space. The politics
of that choice are obvious enough and it is easy to understand
why exactions are appealing to municipal officials: costs are
borne by people who do not live there yet, to the benefit of inplace property owners and voters. But normatively, the distributional consequences are not so clear. Exactions convert at
least some financing for municipal infrastructure from a tax
into a kind of fee for services.5 9 And they reflect an implicit
view that in-place owners are entitled to the status quo, while
developers (and the newcomers they represent) must pay their
own way to enter the municipality. We return to these distributional consequences in the context of our proposal in Part III.
But it is important to see that these dynamics pervade more
traditional uses of exactions as well.
B.

Traditional Energy Planning

In contrast to land-use exactions, which put a price on new
development based on its marginal costs to public infrastructure, traditional energy planning spreads all of the costs of
growth among all of a utility's retail customers.6 0 The conventional energy-planning process relies on a private utility
presenting its customer demand forecasts to energy regulators,
58 Cf. Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the
Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 591, 626 (1998) ("The distributive impact of
...

exaction[s] ...

is a wealth transfer from either current homeowners or vacant

landowners to the beneficiaries of the exaction program.").
59 See, e.g., Ball & Reynolds, supra note 38, at 1526 ("[Tihe shift to nontax
financing has ushered in a more privatized system for the provision of infrastructure and services, one in which individual citizens contribute revenues according
to their consumption or the burdens that their activities impose on the community."); see also Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get
What You Pay for" Model of Local Government, 56 FIA. L. REV. 373, 376 (2004)

(describing exactions as contributing to a "dues mentality" that threatens to replace local taxation).
60

For purposes of our discussion, we use the term "utility" broadly, to in-

clude both municipally-owned utilities (which may, but need not, share the same
jurisdictional boundaries as local government regulators of land use) and investor-owned utilities, which typically operate across multiple local government jurisdictional boundaries. For purposes of simplification, we assume that either
utility is primarily motivated by covering the costs of its operations, which for the

investor-owned utility includes a profit margin.
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who then evaluate the various options for expanding energy
supply infrastructure to meet this customer load.6 1 This topdown utility planning process has failed to sufficiently address
the role of customer energy resources-an issue that, we maintain, is strongly tied to local use of land and its regulation and
that local governments should not have to outsource to private
utilities and state regulators.
1.

Top-Down Energy Resource Capacity Planning

The traditional approach to energy planning makes energysupply-infrastructure decisions based on customer-load forecasts. Under this top-down approach, the customer demand
for energy is an exogenous input to the assessment of energy
resource options. This approach therefore centralizes investment decisions and passes through their costs in a utility's rate
base to all customers-a stark contrast to an exactions-based
approach that would not allocate costs as broadly as possible,
but would allocate them to the specific activities that generate
new burdens.
Like any business making investment decisions, a utility
evaluates its investment options based on the cost of adding
the next kilowatt hour of electricity to the grid to meet its customer needs. Utilities not only own the transmission and distribution grid that delivers energy to customers; 62 many
privately- and publicly-owned utilities also own and operate
their own power-generation facilities, which supply energy to
customers.6 3 When confronted with a need for more energy
supply, however, a utility cannot magically produce kilowatt
hours overnight. It must either purchase energy for its customers (which often requires long-term contractual commitments with power-generation facilities) or build and operate
61
We also use the term "energy regulators" broadly. For investor-owned
utilities, the regulator is typically a state public utility commission. For municipal
utilities, discussed infra at notes 193-195 and accompanying text (subpart III.B,
infra), the regulator is typically a local oversight board, though there is considerable variation in how such boards make their decisions. We assume that regulators are primarily motivated to pursue the public interest in making decisions
about energy supply, which includes providing customers low cost, reliable
energy.
62
Distribution facilities are characterized by proximity to retail customers,
primarily inward flows of power (typically within a specific state), and lower voltage than transmission lines, which typically operate at higher voltages and carry
power over long distances, often across multiple states.
63
How Electricity is Delivered to Consumers, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=electricity-delivery
("Some electric utilities generate all the electricity they sell using just the power
plants they own.").
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these power supply resources itself. The high fixed costs associated with these options require a utility to engage in its own
"capacity expansion planning" in deciding where to make capital investment commitments related to sources of energy supply.6 4 As a leading treatise on utility planning describes it,
"[tlaking the load forecast [of customer demand] as an input, a
generation expansion plan can be specified which will meet
anticipated demand and be used in turn as input to both production costing and reliability evaluation."6 5
In contrast to land-use exactions, then, the pricing of new
energy-resource commitments spreads costs among all of a
utility's customers, much like general taxation.6 6 State-utility
regulation (as well as regulation by local municipal utility governing bodies) reinforces this approach in most jurisdictions to
the extent that it allocates the costs of new investments to
retail customers in setting "Just and reasonable" rates based on
the cost of service. Although federal regulators 6 7 and a number
of states 6 8 have adopted more market-oriented approaches for
customers to choose their energy-supply providers, most state
regulators continue to allocate the costs of new investments
based on the principle that various customer classes should
bear costs in rate base proportionate to the need for new investment to serve their peak load.6 9 General residential customers of a utility, for example, typically pay for the costs of
building power plants and energy delivery infrastructure for
purposes of meeting their load.
While it has provided certainty for utility investors, this
traditional planning approach has proved notoriously ineffective as a way of promoting efficient capital investment in energy
64

KAHN, supra note 10, at 87-88.

65

Id. at 90.

66 See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
Scl. 22, 41 (1971).
67
See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discrim-

inatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (FERC May 10,

1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385).
68
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., State Retail Choice Programs are Popular
with Commercial and Industrial Customers, TODAY IN ENERGY (May 14, 2012),

https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=6250

[https://perma.cc/

QBY7-F3CU) (noting that a majority of residential customers have signed up for

retail power supply choice in as many as nine states, and that a majority of
industrial customers have retail choice in as many as thirteen states).
69
See Robert R. Nordhaus, Electric Power Regulation: Making Partially-Deregulated Markets Work, 54 ADMiN. L. REV. 365, 380 (2002) (observing that "[clost-

of-service set rates, based on the seller's average cost, can be above or below
marginal costs. . .

.1.
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infrastructure. Cost-of-service regulation produces an incentive for utilities to overstate their need for new capital-intensive
power generation assets 7 0 and rarely penalizes errors in forecasting of customer demand growth.7 1 This may not have been
an issue as demand for energy was consistently growing after
World War II, but the price shocks to the energy sector in the
1970s changed everything. New plants that were built on the
assumption of continued demand growth (including predictions that the historic pattern of doubling electricity demand
every decade would continue) 72 and forecasts of high oil and
gas prices came online at a high cost.7 3 As fuel prices began to

decline in the 1980s, the short-run marginal costs of producing
energy were below the average costs associated with expensive
older plants. 74
In addition to spreading the costs of energy resources
among all residential or commercial customers, this conventional approach forces a utility's investors and customers to
bear the primary burden (including the risks) of any economic
and technological change in power-supply resources. It is thus
not surprising that, in rewarding investment in larger-scale
base load power generation assets, traditional energy planning
locks in technological choices about power generation made
decades ago, favors incumbent (sometimes even obsolete)
power-generation resources, thwarts new entrants, and delays
innovation in the energy-resource mix.75 Over the past thirty
years, federal regulators have consistently recognized that
70
See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Finn Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REv. 1052, 1066-67 (1962).
71
For a discussion of how state prudency review of customer rates contributed to a serious overcapacity problem with coal and nuclear baseload plants, see
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 502 (1984) (discussing
overcapacity problems associated with large coal and nuclear plants, and how
regulators sought to correct for them in customer rate setting).
72
See Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets
and Central Planningin Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLuM. L. REV.
1339, 1345-46 (1993).
73 See KAHN, supra note 10, at 2.
74
See id.
75
See Pierce, supra note 71, at 508-09 (discussing prudency in regulatory
approval of nuclear power plants). This led to a significant financial burden for
electric utilities known as the "stranded cost" problem, which pitted investors
(who asked regulators to compensate them for uneconomic utility assets and
higher risks) against incumbent customers (who sought to keep rates low). See,
e.g., Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid DecarbonLzation, 82
BROOK. L. REv. 645, 650-63 (2017) (describing energy law's history with stranded
cost issues); see also Jim Rossi, The Irony of DeregulatoryTakings, 77 TEx. L. REV.
297, 306-10 (1998) (reviewing J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF
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power supply resources bidding into wholesale power markets
are competitive in nature, 7 6 but most states continue to adhere
to a centralized energy-resource-planning process.7 7
2.

Customer Savings as an Energy Resource

At its core, conventional energy planning strikes a regulatory bargain that is fundamentally different in scope and kind
than the land-use-exaction bargain. Traditional energy planning reflects bargaining between a utility and a regulator for
the approval of new energy-resource investments. Under this
paradigm, a utility's proposed energy resources that advance
customer reliability goals are routinely approved by regulators,
who prioritize system-wide reliability in their planning decisions. 7 8 For most energy-capacity resources, utilities strike
this bargain with regulators at the state level, so the jurisdictional footprint of the bargain can differ considerably from that
of land-use bargaining. For this reason, many states adopted
siting laws to ensure that state decisions about energy supply
preempt local land-use decisions to the contrary, as where a
local government refuses to issue permits for a new power plant
mandated by state regulators.7 9
Since the nature of the regulatory proceeding is typically
between the utility presenting a need for new power-supply
capacity and a regulator who is charged to protect all consumers in making its decisions, any customer-produced energy
savings and energy-resource potential is largely sidelined during the traditional energy-planning process. Regulators' primary fixation on the approval of power supply capacity to meet
forecasted customer needs (where customer demand is a mere
input) gives short shrift to the potential that customer demand
itself can provide an energy resource. However, unconsumed
energy-in the form of energy efficiency or conservation-is
effectively the same as additional production. It is just harder
for utilities to capture its economic value.
NETwoRK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997)) (addressing stranded cost issues

related to electric power industry restructuring).
76 See, e.g., Promoting Wholesale Competition, supra note 67.
77 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 68.
78 See, e.g., Leighton Lord & Jeff Ruble, A Case for CoordinatingEconomic
Development Planning with Energy Planning, 7 S.C. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 165, 168-70

(2011) (arguing that economic development planners must better predict future
energy costs due to the increased importance of energy availability, reliability, and
affordability).
79 Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels, Vision Without Site; Site Without Vision,
ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2003, at 23, 34 (describing state siting statutes and their

preemptive effects on local land-use approvals).
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The failure to recognize the potential of customers as energy resources is a major flaw with traditional utility planning.
There is considerable evidence that customer behavior related
to energy usage can have a considerable impact on the need for
new energy supply by reducing customer peaks and overall
customer energy usage.8 0 In addition, the conventional approach ignores customers' opportunity to self-generate energy
rather than purchase it from the utility. Historically, this opportunity may only have been available to the largest customers. Today, however, many smaller commercial and residential
customers can readily self-generate energy through technologies such as distributed solar. 1 Customer energy-storage
technologies are expected to be commercially viable in the next
decade too, potentially accelerating the trend towards selfgeneration.82
Planning decisions regarding new transmission lines often
suffer from a similar myopia in their failure to consider customer demand. Shelley Welton has demonstrated how the traditional interstate-transmission-line planning process (which,
until recently, occurred primarily at the state level) has failed to
take into account these customer energy resources.8 3 She recommends that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) take on a larger role in overseeing its planning and
pricing of the interstate transmission grid.8 4 Since states,
rather than FERC, regulate the approval and retail customer
pricing of new energy supply resources such as power generation, public-service commissions guide incremental investment
80

See Vandenbergh & Rossi, supranote 12, at 1538-44.

81

See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED GENERA-

TION AND RATE-REIATED ISSUES THAT MAY IMPEDE ITS ExPANSION: REPORT PURSUANT TO
SECTION 1817 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 (2007), http://energy.gov/sites/
prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/1817_Report_-final.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X5D9-7N4G] (analyzing the increased availability of distributed energy generation to customers); Jon Wellinghoff & Steven Weissman, The Right to Self-Generate as a Grid-ConnectedCustomer, 36 ENERGY L.J. 305, 305-06 (2015) (addressing
the "tension between consumers' access to distributed generation and distribution utilities aversion to increased levels of customer owned generated increases").
82 See Amy L. Stein, Distributed Reliability, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 887, 918
(2015) (stating that emerging technologies are rendering small-scale energy storage by customers "plausible").
83 See Shelley Welton, Non-TransmissionAlternatives, 39 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv.
457, 475 (2015).
84 Id. at 505-13. In Order 1000, FERC ordered utilities to give non-transmission alternatives such as customer energy resources "comparable consideration"
to building new transmission lines, in order to promote a technologically neutral
transmission-line planning process. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842,
49,869 (FERC Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
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decisions regarding energy resources such as power generation. 85 Not surprisingly, traditional utility-resource planning
at the state level fails to motivate utilities to invest in, or encourage, conservation and demand reduction. The top-down
approach to planning and pricing energy capacity gives utilities
little incentive to encourage customers to reduce energy usage
because this represents lost sales.1 6 In practice, regulators too
often settle for "not too large" net ratepayer revenue losses in
approaching conservation incentives, as fixed costs would need
to be allocated among remaining customers and might lead to
unpopular rate increases.8 7
To date, many state utility regulators have experimented
with measures aimed at reducing customer demand, but in
most jurisdictions cost-based rate regulation of utility energy
resource investments remains the norm in setting retail
rates.8 8 Still, neither utilities nor regulators face particularly
strong incentives to encourage either demand reduction or customer energy-resource innovations. If utilities and their regulators are not encouraging such innovations, customers will
likely underinvest in them too. 8 9 This seems obvious for customer-distributed generation resources, such as rooftop solar.9 0 It is also true of investments that can reduce retail
85

Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has jurisdiction over transmission

facilities and wholesale power supply transactions, but Congress exempted state
regulation of generation and distribution facilities from FERC's jurisdiction. See
16 U.S.C. § 824 (2018).
86
See Vandenbergh & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1560.
87 See KAN, supra note 10, at 240.
88 See Nordhaus, supra note 69, at 380 (-To ensure that market power is
constrained during times of high demand or during generation or transmission
outages, virtually every seller of any consequence in the market has to be subject
to cost-based rates."); see also Jeff Lien, Electricity Restructuring: What Has
Worked, What Has Not, and What is Next, at 15-16 (2008), https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2008/04/30/232692.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4WZ5-UW3D] (noting that, despite wholesale power markets and a handful of
states that have adopted retail electric competition, most distribution utilities
remain regulated and most customers do not choose suppliers but rely on a
default service provider, whose rates are set based on the cost).
89 See Scott Vitter & Thomas Deetjen, How To Overcome the GreatestBarriers
to Rooftop Solar Power, SCI. Am., (June 8, 2016), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/how-to-overcome-the-greatest-barriers-to-rooftop-solarpower/ [https://perma.cc/5625-AN7Y]. For a broader survey of the impacts of
electric utility regulation on innovation, see Luke A. Stewart, The Impact of Regulation on Innovation in the United States: A Cross-IndustryLiteratureReview 15-17
(Econ. Analysis Group, Discussion Paper, June 2010), https://www.itif.org/ffiles/
2011 -impact-regulation-innovation.pdf [https: / /perma.cc/QR7B-SR9L].
90
Cf. Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J.
877, 931-55 (2011) (arguing that the power of local governments needs to be
unleashed to encourage development of customer renewable energy resources).
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customer demand response, such as smart meters.9

1

To take

just one example, customers with time-of-use pricing of utility
services significantly reduce their peak usage of the energy
system in contrast to customers who pay a flat rate. 92 And yet
innovation and deployment of such approaches remains rare.
Traditional energy-planning approaches have been subject
to much criticism, and both markets and regulators are increasingly recognizing customers as energy resources. FERC
has adopted pricing for demand response in organized wholesale power markets, placing economic value on customer commitments to save energy and reduce energy usage.9 3 State
regulators in California and Oregon have made impressive efforts to integrate local land-use planning into state-energy
planning with an emphasis on a range of different energy options that include customer energy savings and new power
supply options. 9 4 Several states, including California, have
91

William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism Ratemaking and

Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 842-43, 860 (2016)

(discussing federal incentives aimed at encouraging innovation from more widespread adoption of smart meters for customers).
92 Cf. Southern Envtl. L. Ctr. & Caroline Golin, A Troubling Trend in Rate
Design: Proposed Rate Design Alternatives to Harmful Fixed Charges 5-7 (Dec.
2015), https://www.southernenvironment.org/uploads/news-feed/ATroublingTrend inRateDesign.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJ7N-SVA3] ("[Time-of-use]
rates communicate to customers that the cost to produce and deliver electricity is
much higher during peak hours than off-peak hours."); see also Boyd & Carlson,
supra note 91, at 856-61, 870-77 (describing various state price incentives designed to promote more efficient customer energy usage, including peak and timevariant pricing).

93 See Demand Response Competition in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658 (FERC Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). As
the Supreme Court noted in upholding FERC's regulations, demand response is
not a creation of either federal or state regulation, but is "a market-generated
innovation for more optimally balancing" the supply and demand of energy. FERC
v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n, 136 S.Ct. 760, 779 (2016).
94

See, e.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, THE ROLE OF LAND USE IN MEETING CALIFOR-

NIA'S ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE GOALS 27 (Aug. 2007), http://www.energy.

ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-600-2007-008/CEC-600-2007-008-SF.PDF
[https://perma.cc/H92Q-FV8B] (observing how several municipal governments
have adopted energy initiatives related to this coordinated policy approach); Or.
Dep't of Land Conservation and Dev., Oregon Statewide Planning Goals (Mar. 2,
2010), https://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/goals/compilation ofstatewide_
planninggoals.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA2S-24QL) (adopting non-mandatory energy conservation guidelines that encourage local governments to recycle and reuse vacant land, consider land-use density, and utilize renewable energy resources). In addition, some utilities and local governments have pursued voluntary initiatives that coordinate local government land-use decisions with energy
planning. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., A Partnershipfor a Greener San Francisco 3 (Aug. 2006), https://www.pge.com/includes/docs/pdfs/shared/environ[https://
ment/pge/features/partnership-for-a-greener-san-francisco.pdf
perma.cc/Y77L-MPAG] (agreement between Pacific Gas & Electric and the City of
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also begun to experiment with "community choice aggregation"-a new kind of retail electricity provider that enables customers in certain local communities to choose different energy
supply options than the default power supply portfolio offered
by the incumbent retail utility.9 5
Most recently, California regulators have adopted a requirement that mandates (as of 2020) the installation of rooftop
solar panels on most new family homes and many multi-floor
apartment and condominium buildings, with a solar panel size
scaled to the floor area of the dwelling unit.96 On average, this
state-wide solar mandate is expected to add $9,500 to the cost
of each new residential home. 97 California regulators estimated that, over a thirty-year period, the new requirements
would add $40 on average to a customer's monthly housing
costs, but the average monthly energy savings for each cusSan Francisco, allowing utility to collect fees from customers to support local
distributed solar and energy conservation programs).
95
See, e.g., KELLY TRUMBULL ET AL., UCLA LUSKIN CTR. FOR INNOVATION, EVALUATING COMMUNITY CHOICE AGGREGATION ALTERNATIVES FOR THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA 3

(Dec. 2017), http://innovation.luskin.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/Evaluating
%20CCA%2Oalternatives%20forO/o2othe%2OCityO/o200f/o2Santa%2OMonica%20
1214171408.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GBD-D94P] (describing community choice
aggregators as a way of enabling 100% renewable options for certain customers).
Seven states currently allow forms of community choice aggregation. See http://
www.leanenergyus.org/cca-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/RY72-BBUN]. while expanding in popularity over the past several years, this approach also has not been
without controversy. See Ivan Penn, Some of California'sMajor Utilitiesare Trying
to Block the Growth of Government-Owned Electricity Programs, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
8, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-community-choiceutilities-20170908-story.html [https://perma.cc/7TU2-CWC7] (noting private
utility efforts to stop the expansion of community choice aggregation, motivated in
part by concern that it could unduly burden the incumbent utility's remaining
customers).
96
See Energy Commission Adopts StandardsRequiring Solar Systems for New
Homes, Firstin Nation, CAL. ENERGY COMM'N (May 9, 2018), http://www.energy.ca.
gov/releases/2018_releases/2018-05-09_building-standards adoptedjnr.html
[https://perma.cc/DV25-ZQ3H]; see also Julia Pyper, Everything You Need to
Know About California's New Solar Roof Mandate, GREENTECH MEDIA (May 21,
2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/everything-you-need-toknow-about-californias-new-solar-roof-mandate#gs. oMSKHjA [https://
perma.cc/S8TM-ECXY] (discussing several questions that have arisen in response to the historic new mandate, and providing a cost-benefit analysis of
mandating rooftop solar).
97 See 2019 Building Energy Efficiency Standards, Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. ENERGY COMM'N (Mar. 2018), http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/
2019standards/documents/2018_Title_24 2019_Building StandardsjFAQ.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2SBF-N5FR]; see also Ivan Penn, CaliforniaWill Require Solar
Power for New Homes, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/05/09/business/energy-environment/california-solar-power.html [https:/
/perma.cc/9BZ7-LT5N (providing that California's new mandate is expected to
add $8,000-$12,000 to the cost of a residential home).

668

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:643

tomer would amount to $80.98 Currently, only 15 to 20% of
new homes built in California include rooftop solar panels,9 9 so
there are some broader societal benefits to this mandate as
well: increased overall energy conservation, less pressure on
California's power grid, a reduced need for new power supply in
the state, and fewer greenhouse gas emissions. California
gives builders flexibility in complying with its new requirement,
including investing in community solar in lieu of solar panels
on individual homes, receiving a 25% credit on solar-panel size
for investing in energy storage, or investing in other measures
that reduce net energy usage for each building. oo
Energy exactions would complement these recent market
and regulatory approaches to recognize customers as energy
resources. Local land-use regulation provides a fertile, albeit
largely untapped, forum for energy exactions. Local regulators
are particularly well-positioned to adopt these kinds of requirements in situations where state utility regulators fail to fully
integrate customer resources and energy conservation into the
centralized energy-resource-planning process. That is, where
state-utility regulators are not planning for a state's future energy needs based on a full social-cost approach, including the
costs associated with climate change, addressing the energy
impacts of land use at the local level can provide a more complete assessment of how distributed energy resources such as
rooftop solar and conservation compare to energy supply resources.101 In contrast to the status quo in most states, such a
decentralized approach would better align the costs associated
with new land uses with their actual impacts (positive and
negative) on the energy system. Additionally, this approach
would allow a point of entry for promoting local grid reliability
and addressing broader societal concerns about providing decarbonized energy sources. Our proposal is not to replace
traditional energy planning, but rather to supplement and improve it. Especially where the status quo utility planning process relegates customer energy resources to the sidelines in
approving power supply investment decisions, recognizing mu98 See Energy Commission Adopts StandardsRequiringSolar Systems for New
Homes, supra note 96.
99 See Jeff Daniels, California Regulators Approve Plan to Mandate Solar
Panels on New Home Construction, CNBC (May 9, 2018, 3:08 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/05/09/california-approves-plan-to-mandate-solar-panelson-new-homes.html [https://perma.cc/WN2A-SH9E].
100 See Pyper, supra note 96.
101 See Scott F. Bertschi, Comment, Integrated Resource Planning and Demand-Side Management in Electric Utility Regulation Public Utility Panacea or a
Waste of Energy?, 43 EMORY L.J. 815, 823-29 (1994).

2019]

ENERGY EXACTIONS

669

nicipal governments as a point of entry to bargain with customers over uses of land that affect the energy system better
enables customer energy resources to participate in energy
planning and energy markets, and can help to produce more
efficient investments in the energy system.
II
EXACTIONS AS A NEW POINT OF ENTRY FOR ENERGY
PLANNING

As we described in the previous Part, land-use exactions
are a general category and not a specific tool. A municipality's
specific implementation of an exaction depends in large measure on local infrastructure capacity (i.e., which marginal impacts of development are the most significant); elasticity in
housing and rental markets (i.e., who will ultimately bear the
costs of the exaction); and community preferences (i.e., which
kinds of development the municipality wants to encourage or
discourage). As a result, actual implementation of our proposal will vary depending on local conditions. 1 0 2 Nevertheless,
this Part broadly describes the mechanics of our proposal for
energy exactions by local governments and begins to consider
how they should be priced. It then explains how the energy
exactions we propose contrast with and can improve current
energy and land-use planning, and concludes by looking at the
politics of our proposal, specifically at its distributional consequences and the likelihood that local governments would adopt
it.
The Mechanics of Energy Exactions
As we envision them, energy exactions will primarily take
the form of a legislated impact fee based upon the anticipated
costs of new burdens on energy infrastructure, and the average
energy usage for the relevant construction. The former is dynamic and will depend both on the cost of electricity in a given
region and the ways in which demand is satisfied in a particular municipality. We consider these details below. 0 3 The latter-the average energy usage of new construction-would also
A.

102
For example, a community focused on the growth of vehicle electrification
to displace fossil fuel transportation might emphasize the need for vehicle charging stations. In 2017, Atlanta, Georgia approved an ordinance that makes vehicle
charging stations mandatory for new construction. See Katie Pyzyk, Atlanta
Passes Infrastructure Ordinance to Support EV Charging, SMARTCTIES DIVE (Nov.
22, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/atlanta-passes-infrastructure-ordinance-to-support-ev-charging/511557/ [https://perma.cc/4MYW-BUZG].
103
See infra subpart II.A.
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vary in predictable ways depending upon climate, building
materials, and business or house size. Electricity usage increases significantly as the size of the house increases, for
example. According to one study, a 1,600 square foot home
will use approximately 9,500 kilowatt hours (kWh) of energy
per year. 1 0 4 A 6,400 square foot home will use nearly 24,500
kWh per year, and energy consumption scales up nearly linearly. 105 The size of the energy exaction should therefore depend on house size. But those averages also vary by region.
While the U.S. monthly average is 911 kWh, there is significant
regional variation, with residential property in hotter climates
consuming much more electricity. 10 6 Households in Maine
generally use 550 kWh per month, while those in Louisiana use
almost 1,300 kWh. 1 0 7
Properly aggregated, data about house size, region, building material, and so forth, makes it possible to predict quite
accurately the energy usage of any proposed development and
then price that increase through an impact fee or other exaction. As a first pass, we envision a set price per kWh of anticipated annual energy usage-for example, $1-as a one-time
exaction charged to the developer as a condition on development. 108 For the average U.S. house, that would amount to
roughly $10,000.109 However, as with California's new statewide solar mandate,1 1 0 a developer could reduce that impact
fee by shrinking the size of the houses or by deploying building
techniques and technologies that would reduce the anticipated
annual energy demand of buildings in the development.
The most visible investment in energy conservation that a
developer can make today is the installation of solar panels.
104

See Barry Fischer, America's Energy Distribution: The Top 1% of Homes

Consume 4 Times More Electricity than Average (andWhy It Matters), OPOWER BLOG
(Mar. 6, 2013), https://perma.cc/QZ7H-5X62 (describing the distribution of
America's electricity usage).
105
See id.
106
See Jordan Wirfs-Brock, How Much Electricity Do You Use Each Month?,
INSIDE ENERGY (May 22, 2014), http://insideenergy.org/2014/05/22/using-en

ergy-how-much-electricity-do-you-use-each-month/ [https://perma.cc/TJM8LMAZ) (citing 2014 data from the Energy Information Administration).
107

Id.

108 That number, again, comes from the combined cost of supplying new energy in the relevant local market and the anticipated energy impact of the new
construction. For a different approach, a student Note proposed imposing an
impact fee based upon LEED certification (and an alternative "Resource Use"
pricing), which can roughly track energy and other resource usage. See Kingsley,
supra note 18, at 555.
109 This is similar to the estimated cost per home of California's new solar
mandate. See supranote 97 and accompanying text.
110 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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Installing rooftop solar on each new home in a residential subdevelopment can dramatically reduce, if not eliminate, any net
increase in energy demand from a new development. 1 1 ' Even if
not every new residence is able to accommodate rooftop solar
panels on a cost-effective basis, a subdevelopment could set
aside land to accommodate solar panels and allow each new
residence to benefit from community solar. There are also less
costly options that can reduce total energy consumption. Installing air-source heat pumps, for example, will save on average 3,000 kWh per year compared to electric heaters.112
Passive solar hot water, where solar panels directly pre-heat
hot water, can create tremendous energy savings at low cost. 1
Depending on climate, better insulation produces average energy savings of 11%.11 Insulation is not only for cold-winter
climates, but is important for air conditioning, too. Energyefficient appliances, smaller houses, and other design elements
also reduce energy consumption. And, importantly for our proposed energy exactions, these and other innovations in conservation all reduce energy consumption in predictable and
quantifiable amounts.
If our hypothetical developer were to invest in some combination of these technologies, the anticipated energy demand of
Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF RESIDENTIAL SOLAR ELECTRICITY, https:/
111
[https://
/www.energy.gov/energysaver/benefits-residential-solar-electricity
perma.cc/4JMB-K9UC] ("A solar electric system provides an opportunity for anyone who is looking to reduce monthly utility bills . . . .").
112
See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, AIR-SOURCE HEAT PUMPS, https://www.energy.gov
/energysaver/heat-pump-systems/air-source-heat-pumps [https://perma.cc/
3C59-FHD7]; Air-to-Air Energy Recovery: A Guide to Equipment Eligible for Enhanced Capital Allowances, CARBON TRUST 3 (Feb. 2014), https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/ffile/376188/ECA77 1
Air-to-AirEnergyRecovery.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PFM-8GBA] (stating that airto-air heat exchangers approved for tax relief by the United Kingdom government
can provide savings of 10 to 20%).
113 See Steven Hill, Comment, Windmills, Tides, and Solar Besides: The European Way ofEnergy, Transportation,and Low-Carbon Emissions, 43 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,102, 10,105 (2013) ("Solar water heating . . is enjoying a
resurgence, using passive solar panels . . . to heat pipes of circulating water for
hot showers, dishwashing, and laundry, reducing water heating bills by 75%.");
Nancy E. Shurtz, Eco-Friendly Buildingfrom the Ground up: Environmental Initiatives and the Case of Portland, Oregon, 27 J. ENVrL. L. & LITIG. 237, 257 (2012)
("(Elnergy demands may be reduced by maximizing passive solar design techniques to provide for heating and cooling.").
114 See Methodology for Estimated Energy Savingsfrom Cost-Effective Air Sealing and Insulating, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=
homesealing.hmimprovement methodology [https://perma.cc/P8AB-2LWC
(stating that homeowners can save an average of 11% on total energy savings
through home sealing and insulation and providing a regional breakdown of average energy savings).
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new dwellings might be cut in half, from 10,000 kWh per year
to 5,000 kWh. And so, the resulting energy exaction could also
be reduced, from $10,000 to $5,000, or perhaps eliminated
altogether if the developer can show that a new dwelling is net
zero in its energy system impact (i.e., that it will produce at
least as much energy as it uses). The power of our proposal is
that local land-use officials do not need to specify or require
any particular technology in new development. This is not a
local version of California's requirement to install solar panels,
but is instead more flexible. By pricing the marginal increase in
energy demand, developers will have an incentive to reduce
energy consumption to the extent that it is cost-effective to do
so. Depending on local conditions and how the energy exactions are priced, some developers might seek to build zeroenergy homes, whereas others might adopt only the most costeffective technologies and pay the exaction for the rest.
Similarly, municipalities rarely pay any attention to the
energy needs that new business or commercial activities will
generate. By pricing the marginal increase in energy demand
by new business and commercial activities, local land use regulators would encourage more efficient energy usage and could
promote deployment of cost-effective technologies. If local regulators assessed the price on the activity itself, new business
and commercial activities would not be allowed to "externalize"
energy resource costs to the larger footprint of a utility's full
customer resource base, but would be forced to take these
costs into account in making their own local investments in
plant, warehouse, or retail facilities.
The implementation of our proposal is therefore quite
straightforward. Like an impact fee, we propose that local
land-use officials adopt a price per kWh that developers or new
business or commercial activities must pay in order to secure
final approval for their developments. The price would be
based on the combination of anticipated energy usage per
square foot in that region, taking into consideration the marginal cost of meeting new energy needs for the relevant utility. If
the developer is proposing to adopt technologies reducing energy impacts, the developer must offer empirical support for
the extent of the energy reductions." 5 And if some of the ap15
One notable aspect of this proposal is the way in which it shifts the traditional burden of establishing the pricing for exactions. John D. Echeverria,
Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 1, 53 (2014)
(noting that "under Nollan and Dolanthe government bears the burden of proof.").
While the government will still bear the burden of justifying the price for the
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proaches have a lifespan-like the use of energy-efficient appliances that will ultimately be replaced-developers should be
required to place restrictive declarations on the deeds requiring
that replacements meet certain energy benchmarks." 6
Where developers ultimately pay some amount in impact
fees, the local government can then use that money to minimize energy impacts in other places within the municipality.
Indeed, as we argue below, the Constitution may even require
the government to use the funds it collects for energy mitigation. This might include grants to owners of existing buildings
to increase their energy efficiency, deployment of net metering
systems, or adoption of community solar, to name just some
examples. Properly priced, new development will ultimately
not increase energy demand (and hence the need for new energy supply) for the municipality as a whole.
An alternative form of exaction can be implemented
through a "concurrency" regime.11 7 In the land-use context,
concurrency commonly refers to a program of phased growth
controls to ensure that development does not outpace infrastructure expansion."" In broad strokes, concurrency requires a municipality to pre-specify anticipated increases in
infrastructure capacity over time.11 9 It then limits the number
exaction, the developers will bear the burden of proving the energy savings in their
development.
116 See Buildings Bulletin 2015-008, supra note 51 (describing deed restrictions). Enforcement of such restrictive declarations can be complicated, so the
imposition of such declarations may not be worth the candle. Regardless, the
anticipated energy savings over the course of the average appliance's lifespan will
likely be significant enough to justify including in the calculation of annual energy
savings.
117 The term "concurrency" comes from computational science and refers to
the notion that several simultaneous computations can have interactive costs and
benefits for an information processing system. See Xuan Shi & Miaoqing Huang,
Cyberinfrastructureand High Performance Computing, in COMPREHENSIVE GEOGRAPHIC INFO. SYs. 341, 349 (Bo Huang, ed. 2017); see also Leslie Lamport, Turing

Lecture: The Computer Science of Concurrency: The Early Years, COMMC'NS OF THE
ACM, June 2015, at 71, https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2015/6/187316-tur
ing-lecture-the-computer-science-of-concurrency/fulltext [https://perma.cc/PT
9H-SFSH] (discussing the significance of concurrency for computer science).
118 In land-use law, concurrency typically takes the form of adequate public
resource requirements as a condition to zoning approval, typically for transportation, water, schools, and parks. See S. Mark White & Elisa L. Paster, Creating
Effective Land Use Regulations Through Concurrency, 43 NAT. RES. J. 753, 754-57
(2003).
119 Kacle A. Hohnadell, Note, Community PlanningAct: The End of Meaningful
Growth Management in Florida, 42 STETSON L. REv. 715, 724-25 (2013) ("The

concurrency provisions required local governments to adopt 'level-of-service'
standards for public facilities, schools, and roads that must have been met before
any development could proceed.").
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of building permits per year so as to keep pace with planned
infrastructure expansion.1 2 0 A developer, however, can accelerate that clock by funding the infrastructure expansion directly.121 This involves paying pre-specified costs to build out
roads, water, and sewer.1 2 2 In effect, developers are then paying for the marginal increase in infrastructure demand beyond
what the municipality originally planned.
This could be applied in exactly the same way to energy. A
municipality would first plan for some reasonable increase in
energy demand, and then limit new development to ensure that
net demand does not exceed this slowly expanding capacity. A
developer wanting to accelerate a project would have two different options that would work together or separately. As with
conventional concurrency, the developer could pay to accelerate the expansion of energy capacity, or the developer could
reduce the energy demand associated with the new project.
Obviously, the more the developer invests in energy savings,
the less the developer would have to pay for increased infrastructure burdens.
Concurrency is quite similar to the straightforward impact
fees described above, but adds flexibility by anticipating increases in energy demand that will not be subject to exactions.
It builds in an expectation of some infrastructure expansion
and so does not require newcomers to shoulder all the costs of
increased capacity. It only requires fees-or delays-for growth
beyond the pre-specified annual limits. Notice, however, those
limits are not the product of today's passive exercise predicting
increases in energy demand. They are at least partly normative. A municipality can decide what is a reasonable expansion
120
See, e.g., Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, ch. 85-55, 2018 Fla. Laws 295 (codified as Fla. Stat.
§§ 163.3161-163.3215 (2018)); see also Thomas G. Pelham, F orn the Rarnapo
Plan to Florida'sStatewide ConcurrencySysten Ramapo's Influence on Infrastructure Planning, 35 URB. LAw. 113, 113-14 (2003) (describing Florida's growth management system, which is one of the most comprehensive in the United States);
DOUGLAS R. PORTER, MANAGING GROWrH IN AMERICA'S COMMuNITIES 147-78 (2d ed.

2008) (discussing strategies for supporting growth by managing infrastructure
development).
121
See Hohnadell, supra note 119, at 726-27 (2013) ("If established facilities
were not in place or at the appropriate level, a developer would not be permitted to
build unless the developer could pay the entire amount to maintain the level of
service. 'In other words, the last one in after service capacity is exhausted, pays
the total bill.'") (quoting Robert M. Rhodes, Florida Growth Management: Past,
Present, Future, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 107, 118 (2007)).
122
See, e.g., id. at 725 ("In effect, the concurrency system required developers
to help pay for the facilities, schools, and roads needed to accommodate the
growth generated by their projects so that local governments would not be stuck
footing the entire bill.").
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of energy demand-the demand for which it then plans-instead of treating demand as entirely exogenous.
In either form, energy exactions might seem to rely too
heavily on decentralized customer decisions to promote energy
conservation and clean energy goals. However, if developers
were incentivized to internalize some of these costs, this could
produce enormous benefits when aggregated at the municipal
level. For example, this would encourage developers to participate in local energy supply resources such as community solar,
promoting these kinds of shared energy supply opportunities.
Another important consequence of our proposal may be the
least obvious. One way of thinking of energy savings is as what
Amory Lovins has cleverly coined a "negawatt"-a unit of energy that no longer needs to be produced due to a reduction in
demand represented by conservation. 1 2 3 Lovins was not the
first to recognize this; as the visionary urban planner Lewis
Mumford wrote in 1961, "demand may be made at any point in
the [electric power] system, and the system as a whole may be
drawn on to respond to it," but ultimately "it is the local user
who determines when it shall be used and how much shall be
taken."1 2 4 So it would seem uncontroversial for both energy
law and urban planners to recognize that a kilowatt of energy
saved is a kilowatt of energy that no longer needs to be
produced.
Energy exactions can incent new forms of economic value
surrounding energy conservation. In many areas of the country, energy intermediaries already bundle and sell into interstate energy markets the energy savings produced by pools of
customers.1 2 5 Developers or municipalities could operate in
precisely the same way, not only raising money through the
exactions themselves but also potentially selling the energy
resources resulting from increased conservation to utilities.
Large developers who are positioned to aggregate energy savings may be able to sell demand response resources into the
interstate wholesale market, where they can offer savings to
adjacent utilities in their region. Alternatively, municipal regulators or city governments may be positioned to aggregate indi123 See Amory B. Lovins, The Negawatt Revolution, 27 ACROSS THE BOARD, Sept.
1990, at 18, 22 (1990), https://www.rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/
RMINegawattRevolution_1990.pdf [https://perma.ce/69SG-UZRXI.
124

LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS TRANSFORMATIONS, AND

ITS PROSPECTS 565 (1961).
125

See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, STAFF REPORT, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND

RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING (2016), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-re
ports/2016/DR-AM-Report2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC9V-FYAS].
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vidual customer savings and sell these resources to others.
Ultimately, energy exaction holds potential to enable developers, neighborhood alliances, and localities to become players in
energy supply markets, without requiring ownership of a largescale energy supply system or the burdensome cost a locality
needs to incur to become a municipal utility. 1 2 6
B.

Informational Benefits for Regulators and Markets

Whether through impact fees or concurrency requirements, energy exactions give local governments a way to supplement the conventional approach to pricing energy with new
fees-an approach that can produce valuable new information
to improve existing approaches to energy planning and pricing.
We begin from the premise that optimal energy prices for various uses must recognize the marginal impact of each additional kWh of energy demand on the energy grid. Established
approaches to pricing of energy, as determined through traditional utility regulation, fail to do this. Exactions allow landuse regulators to add fees on to various land-use approvals in a
manner that can correct for some of the informational deficiencies that plague traditional energy planning and rate settingthough, as we also recognize, identifying an accurate "price" for
energy exactions produces its own challenges.
In theory, efficient investments in energy supply should be
made only where additional customers truly require them.
Competitive interstate energy markets that buy and sell large
quantities of energy in bulk supply electricity for nearly twothirds of the U.S. population.1 2 7 However, the full social costs
associated with energy (including the cost of carbon) are notably absent from most competitive energy prices.1 2 8 If genuinely
competitive, these interstate markets should price energy at (or
very close to) its marginal cost of production and levels of investment in energy infrastructure should reflect this pricing
criterion.
Even where competitive interstate power supply markets
exist, however, state regulators serve the role of approving new
126
See infra notes 193-195 and accompanying text (discussing municipal
utilities).
127
See Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY

COMM'N, https: / /www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp
[https://perma.cc/R2Q6-NGN8] (explaining that two-thirds of the nation's electricity is served in regions with regional transmission organizations).
128 For discussion of the general issue, see Emily Hammonde & David B.
Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141,
192-214 (2016).
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power plants and most state regulators also continue to engage
in some form of price regulation for customers, setting retail
rates based on cost-of-service principles. With traditional energy pricing, regulators aim to maximize social welfare by encouraging a utility (in effect, a regulated monopolist) to produce
a quantity of power that is as close as possible to what a competitive market would produce.1 29 Thus, regulators evaluating
the prudency and pricing of a regulated utility's investment
decisions gauge its efficiency primarily with reference to how
close it is to marginal cost. 130

According to Judge Richard Posner, this "cost causation"
principle requires a utility to show that the benefits to customers are not trivial in relation to the costs a regulator's rate
imposes on them.1 3 1 Admittedly, determining the impact each
customer has on energy supply is complicated. Judge Posner
himself has reminded courts that it is an elusive pricing criterion for competitive interstate power markets and that in reviewing utility rates courts should not expect federal regulators
to quantify benefits with exacting precision, to the last penny
or, in cases of large investments, even to the last million dollars.1 3 2 At most, the cost causation principle is only a general
guidepost for regulators and an even weaker criterion for a
court to use in evaluating whether rates in competitive power

129

See MICHAEL A. CREW & PAUL R KLEINDORFER, THE EcONOMICS OF PUBLIC

UTILITY

REGULATION 13-16 (1st ed. 1986) (outlining arguments in favor of marginal
cost pricing for electric utilities).
130
See, e.g., STEPHEN J. BROWN & DAVID S. SIBLEY, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC UTILITY
PRICING 23-35 (1986) (discussing the efficient pricing of regulated firms); ALFRED E.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND

INSTITUTIONs 77-83

(1970)

(calculating marginal costs where the majority of costs are common).
131 Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding
that "FERC is not authorized to approve a pricing scheme that requires a group of
utilities to pay for facilities from which its members derive no benefits, or benefits
that are trivial in relation to the costs sought to be shifted to its members").
132
Id at 477.
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markets are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, 1 3 3 rather
than a rigorous constitutional standard of review.1 3 4
If marginal cost is not a precise pricing criterion for competitive energy markets, aiming to price energy supply based
on marginal cost is even more difficult in a monopolistic setting, such as when a regulator sets a utility's rates based on
cost of service. Setting the correct rate level for a utility based
on cost of service is a challenge, and can easily produce windfalls and distort investment incentives. A common criticism of
utility ratemaking is that it suffers from informational
problems and, at the extreme, even promotes strategic behavior by regulated firms.' 3 5 As with any approach to modeling,
the accuracy of the inputs regarding customer demand will be
crucial to optimizing investment decisions.' 3 6 Put simply, a
utility's overall rate level (sometimes called its "rate base") will
only be as accurate as the data submitted to regulators in
setting it, and a utility seeking rate recovery may seek to manipulate regulators by lobbying for its proposals, as well as by
presenting misleading information or strategically withholding
information. 13 7 The public choice account of rate regulation,
as producing concentrated benefits (for regulated firms and
their investors) and spreading them broadly among customers,
133
For example, sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act require rates
to be set at a level that is just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. See 16 U.S.C.
§§ 824d, 824e. Most states subject utility ratemaking to similar standards. Despite use of this guidepost to reject an agency rate approval, even Judge Posner
sees regulator approval of public utility rates as subject to a high level of judicial
deference under statutes, much like other agencies' decisions involving complex
issues and agency expertise. See IlL Commerce Comm'n, 576 F.3d at 478 (reversing FERC's approval of a rate, but observing "we require only that the agency have
made a reasoned decision based upon substantial evidence in the record," which
was lacking (quoting Town of Norwood v. FERC, 962 F.2d 20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
134 For discussion of the deferential approach modem courts have adopted in
constitutional review of utility rates, see infra notes 211-212 and accompanying
text.
135

See CARL PECHMAN, REGULATING POWER: THE ECONOMICS OF ELECTRICITY IN THE

INFORMATION AGE 44-45 (1993).
136
See, e.g., Michael Wara, Instrument Choice, Carbon Emissions, and Information, 4 MICH. J. ENVrL. & ADMIN. L. 261, 280-81 (2015) (observing a systemic
bias in overestimating customer demand growth under existing utility planning
models used by federal regulators).
137 Importantly too, utility ratemaking is subject to a regulatory lag problem.
Changes in utility prices are not necessarily linear over time, and there are likely
to be significant plateaus in prices over time when marginal demand can be
satisfied by existing supply, with sudden jumps in cost when increases in demand
have become significant enough to necessitate new capital investments, like
building a new power plant. At best, this leads to customer energy prices that lag
behind the actual incurrence of costs by a utility (since the calculation of rates is
typically based on a forecast of costs for a test year).
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views full cost ratemaking as a form of rent seeking. Not surprisingly, economists have recognized that utility cost-of-ser-

vice ratemaking can invite systematic inflation of utility rate
base and sometimes produces overinvestment in centralized
power-supply capacity.' 3 8 Regulators thus strive endlessly to
keep a utility's profits in check during ratemaking. Notably
too, cost-of-service rates fail to fully reflect the social costs
associated with power supply, since ratemaking focuses primarily on the utility's financial costs and few states consistently
require utilities to internalize the carbon or other environmental costs associated with energy production.
In rate setting, regulators not only struggle to estimate
accurately a utility's overall financial cost, but they lack good
information about the marginal cost of production associated
with each customer. Therefore, they do a poor job of setting the
kinds of prices that produce the information necessary for efficient energy consumption. It may be theoretically appealing to
aim to set each customer's energy prices at the marginal cost of
production, but unlike a competitive market's prices, regulators are unable to gather the information necessary to effectively use marginal cost pricing in setting rates: Regulators do
not have this information for every customer and, even if they
did, pricing energy at marginal cost where average costs are
declining would drive the utility out of business.

39

In attempt-

ing to approximate the output of a competitive market, regulators thus typically calculate rates based on full operational
costs, averaging these across all customers. This means that
utility rates are more likely to reflect a utility's average cost of
production, rather than marginal costs. In allocating these
costs, most rate regulators allow for limited forms of price discrimination, such as different rates for residential, commercial,
and industrial customers, 14 0 but these are crude and vary from
138 See Averch & Johnson, supra note 70, at 1059.
139 For discussion of the problem of pricing a utility's output based on marginal cost where average costs are declining, see R.H. Coase, The Marginal Cost
Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169, 173-74 (1946), defending a two-part pricing

mechanism as a way of addressing this problem. See also William Vickrey, Some
Implications ofMarginal Cost Pricingfor Public Utilities, 45 AM. ECON. REv. 605, 605

(1955) (noting that "the principle of marginal cost pricing is not in practice to be
followed absolutely and at all events, but . .. only] insofar as [it] is compatible
with other desirable objectives," including concerns with fairness and equity).
140 What is known as "Ramsey pricing" sets the rate for each customer class
based on a price markup above marginal cost that is inverse to that group's
demand elasticity. Generally, the greater the ease of a customer finding a substitute for purchasing power from a utility as prices rise, the closer to marginal costs
that customer pays. Allowing limited price discrimination based on demand elasticity across various customer classes allows a utility to collect the revenues it
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marginal costs. In setting rates, regulators also consider a variety of other goals too, such as ensuring that the lowest income and least mobile customers with the fewest substitutes
are not left paying the highest energy rates. 1 4 1 Utility regulators therefore are reluctant to create too many distinctions between customers in rates, and deviations from marginal cost
pricing are commonplace. Flat rates for groups of customers
and customer rates that fail to vary based on power supply are
quite common, but these leave customers limited information
about the true cost of increased energy usage during times of
peak consumption and little incentive to change their demand
behaviors.1 4 2 The lack of variation in the retail energy prices
also produces no information about alternatives customers
may have to consuming power, including reducing demand or
investing in alternative sources of energy supply, which can
hobble regulatory planning and contributes to regulator error
in estimating customer load.
Marginal cost pricing is also a challenging endeavor for
local governments as they set exactions for traditional public
goods. Consider schools, for example. Developers in a number
of states are often required to pay impact fees for the burden a
new development will place on public schools.1 4 3 If the anticipated number of students falls within existing school capacity,
a development's impact will be only the marginal per-pupil cost
of each student. But if a development-or, collectively, a numneeds to cover costs in a manner that maximizes overall social welfare by maximizing the sharing of costs for capital investments. See F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 58-59 (1927). For an insightful
discussion of the challenges with the approach to setting utility rates based on
cost, see Andrew P. Morriss, Implications of Second-Best Theory for Administrative
and Regulatory Law: A Case Study of Public Utility Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 135, 169-84 (1998).
141
Importantly too, applying the Ramsey principle to customer rate allocation
also assumes that energy markets are either perfectly monopolistic or perfectly
competitive, so the distortions of "mixed" markets can impede its ability to generate a quantity and price result that maximizes social welfare.
142 For discussion, see Vandenbergh & Rossi, supranote 12, at 1535-44.
143 See, e.g., Clancy Mullen, NationalImpact Fee Survey 2008 ( Duncan Associates, 2008), http://www.impactfees.com/publications%20pdf/2008_survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHL8-TYHF] (identifying jurisdictions imposing
impact fees for schools). But see Michele L. LeFaivre, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of School Impact Fee Statutes or Ordinances, 16 A.L.R.
6th 289, 289 (2006) (collecting cases challenging school impact fees); Anne M.
Means, The Necessity of School Impact Fees to Create A Better Community for All
Sectors of Society, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 488 (2005) ("Colorado was the first state
that did away with school impact fees in 1996 and little attention was paid to this
new policy across the nation."); Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 248 ("School impact
fees have been particularly controversial and courts have been unwilling to stray
beyond the precise permission accorded by state legislation.").
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ber of developments-will necessitate building another school
building, then the cost goes up substantially. It is nevertheless
possible to build these capital costs into the impact fees by, in
effect, amortizing them over all students.144 Similarly, here,
the marginal cost of each kWh is the sum of the marginal cost
of production, plus a share of the capital costs necessary to
meet demand for that customer.
In contrast to utility rates, however, land use exactions
typically concentrate the imposition of costs (rather than
spread them as broadly as possible) for purposes of producing
community benefits. In this sense, energy exactions may be
even better equipped to produce the kinds of information necessary for efficient pricing of certain public goods-especially
those that utility ratemaking systematically under-produces
due to diffuse, and often broadly realized, benefits. To take one
example, under the traditional ratemaking process utilities
have done a poor job of making investments that address the
negative environmental attributes of various energy sources
associated with climate change-a problem which, if addressed, could produce societal benefits beyond the utility's
customer footprint.14 5 Absent a full social cost pricing approach (which few states have even considered), traditional
utility planning and ratemaking simply does not reward utilities for making these kinds of investments. Rather, utilities

&

144
A typical school impact fee ordinance will allow a municipality to charge a
fee representing the costs that new development will impose on the system as a
whole, often consistent with a capital development plan. The fee is not designed
to cover ongoing per-student operating costs for the school district. See, e.g.,
AUBURN, WASH., CODE § 19.02.030 (2011), http://www.codepubllshing.com/WA/
Auburn/html/Auburnl9/Auburnl902.html#19.02.030 [https://perma.cc/
NU6F-42TP] (authorizing school impact fees for "system improvements that are
reasonably related to the new development"); ORANGE COUNTY, FIA., CODE § 23143(b), https://library.municode.com/fl/orangecounty/codes/code-of-ordin
ances?nodeld=PTIIORCOCOCH23IMFEARTVSCIMFE
[https://perma.cc/
BBF4-2EHR] ("The monies deposited into the school impact fee trust account
shall be used solely for the purpose of providing growth-necessitated capital improvements to educational plants and ancillary plants of the school system which
are approved by the school board in its capital improvements budget consistent
with the state school plant survey . . . ."); School Impact Fee Project, WILLIAMSON
CTY., TENN., https://www.williamsoncounty-tn.gov/1663/School-Impact-FeeProject [https://perma.cc/EAY2-ZHH2] (describing different methods of calculating impact fees, and including one in which "tihe improvements are identified by
a facility plan and development is identified by a land use plan. In this method,
the total cost of relevant facilities is divided by total demand to calculate a cost per
unit of demand").
145
Remedying this problem is one of the motivating intuitions behind Byrne
Zyla's work. See Byrne & Zyla, supranote 3, at 758 ("Monetary exactions are [a]
common tool that can force developers to mitigate the climate costs of new
development.").
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commonly face a tradeoff between, on the one hand, increasing
sales revenues by making investments with concentrated benefits (in terms of financial payoffs to investors) such as centralized power plants and, on the other, promoting alternative
resources such as distributed solar panels or energy storage
devices-which may be owned by customers or third parties.
To the extent the utility planning and ratemaking process does
not require utilities to quantify the social cost impacts of customer activities that require energy, it will tend systematically
to favor the investment that increases its sales, not the investment that produces more diffuse benefits for society. 1 4 6
Importantly too, in contrast to utility ratemaking (which
addresses a monopolistic market), the market for various uses
of land is more likely to be competitive and thus may be better
suited to variations in pricing that genuinely reflects the incremental energy impacts of new uses of land. 14 7 As set today,
utility rates do not systematically consider customer alternatives to energy consumption at the local level, as utilities face
little or no incentive to present this information to regulators in
setting a rate level or in crude residential classifications in rate
allocation. And the utility planning process fails too to incorporate fully this kind of customer demand information.
Municipal exactions aim directly at the marginal energy
impacts of each new land use, so they are better suited than
state-centered utility planning to encourage discussions of locally motivated expansions in energy demand and their alternatives. A local land-use exactions approach favors a true
assessment of marginal cost of new customer energy usage in
ways that are not limited to the utility's financial costs. Exaction fees for different forms of development can produce valuable information about the various options new customers face,
including how much energy they will consume, when they will
need it, and whether they can commit to reducing demand for
it or investing in distributed energy resources such as solar
panels or energy storage. It is thus more likely than traditional
utility planning to produce information and lead to assessment
of the potential for demand reduction and new energy resource
opportunities at the local level-opportunities that may be ignored entirely in conventional utility planning. If the ultimate
146 There are exceptions for utilities seeking to allocate the costs of expanding
distribution lines, as we discuss infra at subpart III.B.
147 Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 211-13 (discussing how elasticity in local
housing markets effects how much of the cost of exactions can be passed on to
consumers).
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goal of an energy market is to align customer prices with a
social cost measure of customer energy impacts, including the
full system costs and carbon costs associated with locally motivated expansions in energy demand, it will also help to induce
more efficient energy investment decisions than relying entirely
on inaccurate investment signals produced by cost-of-service
regulation.
For political economy reasons, one might look skeptically
at local governments as even more susceptible than utility regulation to forms of mischief, manipulation, and capture in setting energy exaction prices and using the revenues that they
produce. However, as we discuss below, in the most extreme
cases constitutional and statutory doctrines of land-use law
can also help to safeguard efficiency and social welfare in the
pricing of energy exactions. 14 8

C.

Risk Diversification and Regulatory Competition

Traditional utility ratemaking allows regulated utilities and
their investors to capture rents from customers, leading to inefficient energy supply investments and various forms of resource overcapacity, especially for centralized power plants.14 9
By contrast, the approach we are advocating would invite a
municipal government to capture a portion of what otherwise
would be considered a utility's rate base by reducing the demand curve and so minimizing new energy requirements. This
would help to address a classic public-choice problem with cost
of service ratemaking, while also producing local revenue. Beyond producing better information for regulators and markets,
we see two significant benefits to this: better risk diversification
in energy infrastructure investments and improved intergovernmental competition.
In contrast to traditional energy planning, energy exactions
will favor a more decentralized approach to cost allocation by
forcing developers and the ultimate housing and business consumers-i.e., energy customers-to bear costs of new energy
supply resources.15 0 By distributing the risks of new investments related to energy supply, this kind of approach can help
to break through some of the asset lock-in related to centrally
planned utility energy supply. For example, encouraging inSee infra subpart III.C.
149 See Averch & Johnson, supra note 70, at 1066-67; Pierce, supra note 71,
at 502.
150 The extent to which developers will pass the costs of exactions on to end
consumers is considered infra at notes 161-174 and accompanying text.
148
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vestment in distributed customer energy resources helps to
meet power supply and system reliability needs associated with
demand growth, without burdening all of a utility's existing
customers. In this sense, energy exactions help to assure that
the risks associated with infrastructure investments for customer growth in certain geographic areas are borne by those
who are most likely to benefit, i.e., new developments. Diversifying the financial risks of investment in energy infrastructure
is also likely to help improve the energy resource balance in the
power supply portfolio and improve reliability through greater
grid resiliency.
A local government's initiative in setting energy exactions
promises to improve intergovernmental competition too-an
advantage that local energy exaction may hold over a statewide
requirement such as California's rooftop solar mandate. Most
obviously, encouraging local governments to adopt their own
forms of energy exactions would spark greater horizontal competition around energy resources and their development between local communities. A municipality that adopts our
approach should see energy prices for incumbent users decline
as the costs of capital, system-wide improvements will be borne
more by newcomers. If those costs take the form of "negawatts"-i.e., demand savings-then everyone in the municipality or service area should benefit by reducing the overall costs
of energy, providing a competitive advantage over other municipal areas.
As significant in our view, local forms of energy exactions
should increase vertical intergovernmental competition between municipal governments and state-utility regulators. Exactions will produce some combination of energy savings and
actual fees. Any fees a municipality collects from energy exactions can-and, if our proposal is to avoid increasing (rather
than decreasing) energy demand associated with growth,
must-be used to produce energy savings elsewhere in the municipality. This would effectively allow a local government to
capture a portion of rents that would otherwise be recovered in
a utility's base rate. If a utility wishes to keep these rents,
rather than lose them to local governments, it will lobby regulators to adopt exactions for new development in utility rates or
in statewide requirements such as California's rooftop solar
mandate. To the extent that local energy exactions present
state regulators with new information about the feasibility and
benefits of local energy exactions, this can help to improve the
quality of centralized planning and make it less likely that reg-
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ulators will adhere to utility ratemaking approaches that fall to
recognize the benefits of customer energy resources.
D.

The Local Case for Energy Exactions

The discussion so far has made the case that energy exactions could have many structural benefits. They would produce the kind of information needed to properly incentivize
energy conservation in the design and building of new developments. The resulting marginal cost pricing would encourage
greater diversification in the risks of investing in new energy
supply. And they would unleash new forms of regulatory competition, partly by allowing developers and local governments to
become players in energy markets, enabling them potentially to
sell energy resources in the form of bundled energy savings.
But why would a local government implement our proposal?
The political case for energy exactions requires a closer look at
the incentives faced by local governments.
At first blush, the answer seems obvious. Energy exactions would help to control energy costs by forcing developers
to shoulder more of the burdens of increased energy demands.
Moreover, they would provide an additional source of revenue
from the development process, to the extent a developer pays
the fees instead of producing net zero buildings. Energy exactions therefore have a strong intuitive appeal. There is, however, an equally strong countervailing intuition. Although not
legally a tax in most jurisdictions, an exaction is nevertheless
the functional equivalent of a tax on development. 15 1 And as a
tax, the effect will be to raise the cost of construction in a
municipality that adopts energy exactions vis-a-vis a neighboring municipality that does not. The predictable effect will be to
shift new development to other municipalities, at least on the
margin.1 5 2 For local officials pursuing mobile capital, this dynamic might make energy exactions a tool that is better suited
to statewide rather than local regulation, or perhaps only a tool
in theory.
151
Compare, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Lincoln v. City of Lincoln, 711
N.W.2d 871, 876-79 (Neb. 2006) (holding that impact fees are not taxes requiring
state approval), with Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders
Ass'n of Miss., 932 So.2d 44, 53 (Miss. 2006) (rejecting power of local government
to impose impact fees without express authorization). For a helpful overview of
the issue, see W. Andrew Gowder, Jr. & Bryan W. Wenter, Exactions and Impact
Fees 2007: The Limits of Local Authority, 39 URB. LAw. 645, 646-53 (2007).
152
This is a substantial political constraint on local governments imposing
exactions. For a detailed account, see Been, supra note 35, at 506-28.
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These competing intuitions reflect a deep tension within
land-use regulations more broadly. Indeed, this equivocation
about energy exactions exists with exactions in any form; they
all raise the cost of development and so would appear to put a
municipality at a disadvantage vis-a-vis its neighbors in attracting new investments. There is nothing unique about energy exactions in this regard. If exactions of any kind grow too
high, developers will simply move elsewhere. Competition between local governments will therefore constrain the extent of
exactions to some extent.1 -3 Nevertheless, exactions remain a
common part of the development landscape, and local governments use them despite (or sometimes because of)1 5 4 the fact
that they increase the costs of development relative to municipalities that do not impose exactions. Their appeal, however,
may depend on the political landscape in any particular
municipality.
Local governments do not all have the same incentives. At
the simplest level, they are arrayed along a spectrum from prodevelopment to anti-development. 15 5 The former are typically
controlled by the "growth machine," which includes that constellation of businesspeople that make up the development industry broadly. 5 6 Developers themselves, but also realtors,
lawyers, and builders, all tend to favor development and are
often its aggressive champions.' 5 7 On the other hand, antidevelopment jurisdictions-what William Fischel has called
"Homevoter" jurisdictions-are controlled by in-place local
homeowners who view new development as competition for ex153

See iCL

Driving up the cost of development can be appealing to local governments
seeking to restrict growth and limit the supply of new housing, often in the service
of Not-in-My-Backyard ("NIMBY") pressures towards exclusionary zoning. See,
e.g., Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in its
Place: Affordable Housing and GeographicalScale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667,
1669-73 (2013).
155 Cf. Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRCAL LEGAL STuD. 227, 228-38 (2014)
(describing different theories of local politics and finding support for a
"homevoter-based theory" even in cities).
156 See, e.g., JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 32 (1987) (discussing cities as "growth machines" and
discussing how increased rents create wealth for certain members of society);
Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of
Place, 82 AM. J. Soc. 309, 309 (1976) (analyzing cities as "growth machines").
157
Christopher Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. 75, 117
(2016) ("Conventional wisdom holds that cities are growth machines, in the thrall
and political control of development interests-builders, construction workers,
realtors, bankers, and so forth.").
154
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isting housing stock. 15 8 Their interests tend to favor restricting
the supply of new housing in order to protect the value of their
own homes. 19

Growth-machine jurisdictions will presumably find little to
like in the proposal for energy exactions. To the extent it puts
the municipality at a competitive disadvantage for attracting
new development, the proposal will garner little support. But
in-place homeowners may well have a different view. As we
have explained above, by default the current cost-of-service
pricing regime spreads the marginal costs of development over
the entire utility customer base.16 0 The cost of new energy
production necessitated by development will end up costing inplace consumers more money in the form of higher energy bills.
Shifting those costs to newcomers shields existing consumers
from them, making energy exactions appealing in municipalities where local homeowners are a dominant political force.
Exactions' appeal will depend in large part on who actually
bears their ultimate cost. There are three likely possibilities,
depending on elasticity in local housing markets.161 Most obviously, costs may be borne by the developers themselves who
pay the exaction out of pocket. But those costs may ultimately
be passed on to the end consumers in the form of higher prices
for the housing.162 Or the costs may be absorbed into vacant
land values, effectively reducing what developers are willing to
pay because of the higher costs of construction.16 3 Local economic conditions and the availability of substitute municipalities with different pricing will determine where the costs of
energy exactions will ultimately fall.1 6 4 As a result, the politics
of energy exactions will be intensely local. Even growth-machine jurisdictions could embrace energy exactions if the costs
can be passed on to the end customers.
158

FISCHEL, supra note 50, at 14-16; see also Vicki Been, City NIMBYS, 33 J.

LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 217, 217 (2018) (identifying cities as occasionally motivated

by NIMBYS and specifically by renters concerned about rising rents).
159 See FISCHEL, supra note 50, at 18.
160 See supra subpart I.B.
161
See Been, supra note 1, at 148-50 (presenting a theoretical framework for
allocating the costs of impact fees).
162
See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 214 (noting that "new home purchasers
will bear the rest of the impact fee burden in higher purchase prices").
163
See id. (stating that "development impact fees actually shift approximately
a quarter of the burden of these fees onto the owners of undeveloped land" (citing
John Yinger, The Incidence of Development Fees and Special Assessments, 51
NAT'L TAx J. 23, 35 (1998))).
164
See Been, supranote 1, at 149.
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There are, of course, other effects of energy exactions that
will impact the politics of their adoption. Exactions could prove
attractive to many local governments seeking to promote clean
energy, spur local economic growth in clean energy, and attract
new industries, especially as large business and corporate
employers increasingly demand clean energy for their
operations. 165
A number of municipalities have sought in recent years to
brand themselves as green cities. 166 They have made sustainable development a part of their identity. From the adoption of
form-based codes to open-space requirements, new development can be a visible expression of a local government's regulatory preferences. Today, many local governments are keenly
interested in promoting an environmental identity.1 6 7 This can
reflect genuine commitments on the part of voters and elected
officials, and also can be economically beneficial if it makes the
municipality particularly desirable. 168 In this case, energy exactions are not a zero-sum allocation from existing energy con165

See WORLD WILDLIFE FED'N ET AL., POWER FORWARD 3.0: How THE LARGEST U.S.

COMPANIES ARE

CAFTURING

BUSINESS VALUE

WHILE ADDRESSING

CLIMATE CHANGE

&

(2017), https://c402277.ssl.cfl.rackcdn.com/publications/1049/ffles/original/
PowerForward_3.0_-_April_2017_-_DigitalSecondFinal.pdf?1493325339
[https://perma.cc/RC57-3AFD] (finding that 63% of Fortune 100 companies have
at least one clean energy target and 48% of Fortune 500 companies have at least
one climate or clean energy target-up five percentage points from 2014).
166
Cf. Byrne & Zyla, supra note 3, at 762 ("Many local governments have
already taken climate change on as an issue of local significance.").
167 See Michael Burger, "It'sNot Easy Being Green": Local Initiatives, Preemption Problems, and the Market ParticipantException, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 835,
865-67 (2010) (describing local environmental initiatives); Hari M. Osofsky
Janet Koven Levit, The Scale ofNetworks?: Local ClirateChange Coalitions, 8 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 409, 414-27 (2008) (examining local climate change efforts in Portland,
Oregon, and Tulsa, Oklahoma); U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, Mayors Climate Protection Center, https://www.usmayors.org/mayors-climate-protection-center/
[https://perma.cc/T3JX-7Y32] (reporting that 1,060 mayors were participating in
the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement); U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED
Public Policies (May 2010), http://www.usgbc.org/Docs/Archive/General/
Docs691.pdf [https://perma.cc/4965-LXDQ] (surveying 206 local LEED
initiatives).
168

Cf RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS 68-82 (2002) (arguing

that cities' economic success depends upon attracting the "creative class," which
includes adopting policies that are appealing to artists and entrepreneurs, among
others); Jeffrey M. Berry & Kent E. Portnoy, A Creative Class Theory of City
Sustainability Policies 11-12 (Sept. 3, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://
as.tufts.edu/politicalscience/sites/all/themes/asbase/assets/documents/berry
/creativeClass.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X8U-6FAG] ("Cities that pursue sustainability policies have large creative class populations, are politically liberal,
and have active local environmental groups involved in policymaking, and tend to
be the cities that are experiencing the greatest economic growth. All of these
characteristics go together. We refer to these results as 'a creative class theory of
city sustainability policies.'").
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sumers to newcomers but may in fact increase property values
for everyone.
Complicating this political case for energy exactions is the
tension between our proposal and issues of exclusion and affordability. Impact fees and other forms of exactions have the
potential to effect exclusionary policies precisely because they
can shift costs to newcomers, protecting in-place property owners.1 6 9 The economic analysis is straightforward and compelling. Exactions are passed on to those who purchase
individual dwellings and thus raise the cost of housing, leading
to lower levels of production at higher prices. 17 0 This same
dynamic that makes exactions potentially appealing to local
officials also makes them troubling to affordable housing advocates and the prospective residents in need of affordable housing options.1 7 1 This is, of course, true of all exactions, not just
energy exactions. In broad strokes, we think the benefits of
forcing developers to internalize burdens of new development
on energy infrastructure are worth the costs to newcomers,
both because this results in better energy pricing and because
it creates market pressures to reduce new energy consumption. Of course, when it comes to trade-offs between incommensurable social values, reasonable minds can disagree. 1 7 2 It
is enough here to recognize both the promise and the perils of
energy exactions.
This political account is not a normative theory of who,
ultimately, should bear the costs of new energy demand, because there is no reason in the abstract to favor in-place property owners or utility customers over newcomers, or vice-versa.
These are political and contingent decisions. Above, we have
made the case for emphasizing system-wide marginal cost pricing for energy instead of always defaulting to spreading the
costs among all customers, and have highlighted how limited
See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46
1, 11 (2014) (noting that "the switch from sharing infrastructure costs
to imposing impact fees on new development is an exclusionary fiscal policy"); see
also Robert C. Ellickson, SuburbanGrowth Controls:An Economic and LegalAnalysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 392-402 (1977) (examining the allocational and distributional effects of growth controls such as exactions).
170
See Eagle, supranote 169, at 15 ("As the cost of housing increases, less of
it will be demanded. Unfortunately, the production of more housing is the key to
housing affordability.").
171
See id. (noting that the cost of exactions "largely is passed on to housing
purchasers and their tenants"); see also Been, supra note 1, at 148-49 (discussing effect of impact fees on housing affordability).
172
Cf Christopher Serkin, The New Politics of New Property and the Takings
Clause, 42 VT. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (2017) (arguing that the politics of property
protection and exclusionary zoning in particular are changing).
169
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forms of price discrimination in utility ratemaking can maximize welfare in cost allocation.17 3 But there are also countervailing concerns like the exclusionary impact of increasing
development costs in a particular municipality.1 7 4 Those conflicts cannot be resolved through any one-size-fits-all approach. And, fortunately, they do not need to be. The point
here is simply that our proposal is politically plausible and
produces benefits that the present approach does not. Some
number of local governments are likely to find our proposal
appealing. We predict that some subset will actually adopt
energy exactions at the local level, so long as they are not
otherwise prohibited, which is the next issue to consider.
III
LEGAL OBSTACLES TO ENERGY EXACTIONS

While we think that there are many potential benefits to
local governments deploying energy exactions and proposals,
such as energy concurrency, uncertainty about the law could
also discourage their adoption. We see three potential legal
obstacles: whether municipal governments are authorized to
adopt exactions under their enabling legislation; intrastate preemption; and constitutional challenges. A statewide energy exaction such as California's recent solar mandate for new homes
can readily be adopted by a state legislature or a properly authorized regulatory body, and we also believe it can withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Since land-use regulation typically occurs at the local level, however, the issues of state authorization and preemption require some additional analysis.
Nevertheless, we conclude that municipalities in many states
would likely be free to adopt energy exactions today, and that
these too should withstand constitutional scrutiny. None of
these potential legal concerns presents a serious threat to the
adoption of energy exactions by local governments-at least
not an insurmountable barrier in most instances.
A.

State Authorization

As an initial matter, it is important to determine whether
state law authorizes municipal governments to adopt energy
exactions at all or, relatedly, whether legislation limiting local
fees might somehow prohibit them outright. As of 2015,
twenty-nine states had adopted enabling acts for local develop173
174

See supra subpart I.B.
See supra notes 169-72.
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ment fees. 1 7 5 In the remaining twenty-one states, there is no
express enabling legislation. At least among home-rule jurisdictions, the absence of state legislation gives local governments free reign to experiment, and so there would be no
statutory constraint on the use of energy exactions. 17 6 Moreover, both California and Utah explicitly allow the use of exactions for the impact on power generation and distribution.' 7 7
In the other twenty-six states with enabling legislation,
however, the story is more complex. Most states' enabling legislation provide that exactions can only be used to address prespecified public service needs, facilities, or capital improvements that are related to development burdens. Arizona, for
example, allows the imposition of fees "to offset costs ... associated with providing necessary public services to a development."1 7 8 "Necessary public services," are in turn defined as
"facilities," which are limited to roads, water systems, sewer
systems, storm water systems, parks, fire and police facilities,
and libraries. 17 9 The Arizona statute notably does not include
power generation or supply in its list of "necessary public services." That omission might prove disabling. In Southern Nevada Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of North Las Vegas, the
Nevada Supreme Court, construing the state's statute excerpted above, held that a local ordinance exacting an impact
fee for fire and emergency services was not authorized. 8 0 Applying the expressio untus est exclusio altertus interpretive canon, the Nevada Supreme Court held that impact fees for fire
and emergency services are not authorized because they are
not expressly listed.1 8 ' The same would presumably be true of
energy exactions.
175

Clancy Mullen, State Impact Fee Enabling Acts 1 (Duncan Associates,

2015), http://www.impactfees.com/publications%20pdf/state-enabling-acts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RJF3-ELWG]. For an older, but more scholarly, treatment, see
Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling
Legislation, 25 URB. LAW. 491, 497-503 (1993).
176
See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2255, 2261-383 (2003) (discussing home rule jurisdictions).
177
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66002 (West 2007) (defining "facility" or "improvement"
to include "[flacilities for the generation of electricity and the distribution of gas
and electricity"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 11 -36a- 102 (West 2014) (defining "public facilities" for which exactions are permissible to include "municipal power facilities").
178

Am.

REv.

STAT.

ANN.

§

9-463.05

(2014);

see also NEv.

REV. STAT.

§ 278B.050 (2013) ("'Impact fee' means a charge imposed by a local government
on new development to finance the costs of a capital improvement or facility
expansion necessitated by and attributable to the new development.").

§

179

ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.

180

913 P.2d 1276, 1278-80 (Nev. 1996).

181

See id.

9-463.05 (2014).
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In other states, enabling statutes place restrictions on the
use of the exactions and not on the nature of the burdens
themselves, but the effect is the same. As an example, Arkansas's impact-fee legislation provides that a "municipality . .
may assess, collect, and expend development impact fees only
for . . . public facilities . . . ."182 "Public facilities" are then

narrowly defined to include only water systems, wastewater
systems, storm water facilities, roads, libraries, parks, and police, fire, and emergency medical facilities. 1 3 Others limit exactions only to the provision of new infrastructure specifically
for the use of the new development, instead of for upgrades to
existing infrastructure for the benefit of existing users.18 4
Thus, to the extent that courts construe state legislative
authorization for local impact fees narrowly, municipalities relying on these statutes to authorize local impact fees may require clarifying legislation that extends exactions to energy
related activities, expanding their scope to include facilities and
activities such as power generation and energy efficiency. In
twenty-six states, this kind of modest legislative change would
probably be necessary to enable local governments to adopt our
proposal. In the remaining twenty-four states, however, local
governments appear to have the authority today to adopt energy exactions, at least so long as they are not preempted nor
run afoul of constitutional limits.
B.

Intrastate Preemption

Even if municipal governments are authorized to adopt energy exactions under their enabling legislation, public utility
laws can still preempt them. State public utility commissions
typically approve investments in new energy supply resources
§

182

ARK. CODE ANN.

183

IJ

184

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

14-56-103 (2015).

§

9-463.05 (2014) ("Development fees may

not be used for any of the following: . .
correcting or replacing existing necessary
of service to existing development."); NEV.
ing the use of impact fees for "[tihe repair,

. (d) Upgrading, updating, expanding,
public services to provide a higher level
REV. STAT. § 278B.280 (2013) (prohibitoperation or maintenance of existing or

new capital improvements or facility expansions"); N.M. STAT. ANN.

§

5-8-5 (2015)

("Impact fees shall not be imposed or used to pay for: ...
upgrading, updating,
expanding or replacing existing capital improvements to provide better service to
existing development. . . ."). Two states impose a similar limitation by requiring
that impact fees be used only for "new growth." See GA. CODE ANN. § 36-71-8(b)
(2010) ("Development impact fees shall not be used to pay for any purpose that
does not involve system improvements that create additional service available to
serve new growth and development."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1-1010 (2012) (mandating that impact fees may not be used for "a purpose other than system improvement costs to create additional improvements to serve new growth").
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based on need, and also set the rates for private sales of energy
by utilities. This presents potential for "intrastate" preemption
challenges to local initiatives related to energy exactions. 185
Importantly, as Hannah Wiseman has shown in her analysis of
local regulation of fossil-fuel fracking, the mere existence of
state regulation of an activity does not entail a blanket condemnation of all local regulation of that same activity.1 8 6 Rather,
especially given local government control over land use and
economic growth, preemption analysis of local laws related to
energy resources must make some effort to disaggregate control over different institutional aspects of regulation.' 8 7 This
requires careful analysis of state and local law in each context,
as well as the institutional features of each level of government.
Intrastate preemption doctrine proceeds along both express
and implied dimensions.' 88
It is useful to begin by identifying state laws that might
expressly preempt energy exactions. Legal disputes have
plagued recent efforts to apply local land use "siting" of activities such as oil and gas fracking and wind energy development,
and these kinds of disputes could also be of relevance to some
energy exactions.1 8 9 In many states, siting statutes for power
plants authorize a state utility commission to approve the siting of a new power plant based on "need."' 9 0 These statutes
frequently expressly preempt a local government decision that
rejects a state's previous approval of a power plant project. To
the extent that such a statute contains an "express" preemption clause, a local government's refusal to issue land-use ap185

See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U.

L. REV. 1113,

1113-17

(2007) (observing how the expansion of "new and innovative policies" at the local
level has also led to a rise in claims that local regulation is preempted by state
law).

186

See Hannah J. Wiseman, DisaggregatingPreemption in Energy Law, 40

HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 293, 326-39 (2016).
187

See A.

Express preemption of local government initiatives of this sort is rare, but
one possible example is state constitutional prohibitions on special taxes or feesan issue that relates to the authorization for preemption, which we discuss below.
See infra subpart III.A. Another example is state siting statutes which expressly
preempt local land use refusals, though as discussed below this regulates use of
energy exactions for certain power supply facilities, not whether a local government can adopt exactions for a range of energy-related purposes that include
reducing customer demand. See infra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
189 See Uma Outka, IntrastatePreemption in the Shijting Energy Sector, 86 U.
CoLO. L. REV. 927, 966-75 (2015); Wiseman, supra note 186, at 298.
190
See Brown & Daniels, supra note 79, at 24. Beyond siting, many state
franchise laws have been interpreted to limit new entrants from competing with
an incumbent utility, even where the incumbent utility does not offer customers
the service a new entrant is willing to provide.
188
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provals associated with constructing a state-approved power
plant or transmission line thus would be preempted. However,
nothing in state power-plant siting statutes would appear to
prohibit a local government from taking its own initiative to
limit customer demand growth or to collect new revenues from
customers, or using these revenues to promote investments in
distributed energy supply or energy services, such as customer-sited rooftop solar arrays or energy storage.' 9
Beyond express preemption, the implied dimension of intrastate preemption includes field, obstacle, and conflict preemption. The most sweeping form of implied preemption-that
state retail-rate-setting preempts local energy exactions because it "occupies the field"-is somewhat circular, since any
preemption conclusion would depend on how the relevant
"field" of state law is defined. However the field is defined, the
mere existence of state-utility regulation does not categorically
prohibit municipal governments from using taxes, fees or regulation to address any energy incentives related to energy consumption and supply. Local governments routinely exercise
land-use authority in ways that implicate energy, from zoning
for solar and wind-power generation, to prohibiting hydraulic
191 Some state siting statutes are expansive in scope, limiting who can produce energy regardless of size and sometimes even prohibiting third-parties (other
than a customer or utility) from developing new projects that produce and sell
energy, so it is certainly conceivable that some customers or local governments
would need to seek state approval for certain power generation activities. For a
particularly troubling recent case applying a state utility law to keep a church
from placing solar panels on its roof, see State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. North
CarolinaWaste Awareness & Reduction Network, 805 S.E.2d 712, 714 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2017) (finding third-party solar provider was illegally acting as a "public
utility" by agreeing to provide and maintain solar panels to a church), affd, 812
S.E.2d 804 (N.C. 2018). These state law barriers to new entrants, including broad
applications of siting statutes, can be a significant drag on renewable power
development. One recent study surveys 160 manufacturers and finds that 25% of
these have corporate renewable energy targets. See ALEXANDRA REKKAS, DAVID
GARDINER & Assocs., Renewable, Climate Commitments Drive Clean Energy

Purchases, https://www.dgardiner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/DGAClean-Energy-Access FactSheetFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/77JT-U289]. To
the extent that a significant number of manufacturing facilities that, according to
corporate targets, need to be powered by 100% renewable energy are also located
in states that limit access to renewable energy, economic development officials
face challenges in attracting and retaining businesses. Due to facility size requirements, many state siting statutes do not apply to smaller-scale power generation, such as roof top solar. For example, the Minnesota Power Plant Siting Act
only applies to power facilities that are greater than 50 megawatts. For discussion, see MINN. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SOLAR SmNG AND ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEw WoRKING GROUP FINAL REPORT (2015), https://mn.gov/eera/web/project-fle?legacyPath

=/Opt/documents/SWGReportcomplete-post.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX3THX5U]. Thus, promoting more small-scale, decentralized solar deployment is one
way to overcome some of these legal barriers to renewable power.
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fracturing.1 92 The mere fact of state retail-rate-setting does not
occupy the field of land-use regulations that have some impact
on energy supply or demand, and energy exactions are really
no more than that. They do not involve the direct regulation of
energy production by a utility at all; instead, they merely regulate development in a way that seeks to minimize new energy
demand.
If we dig deeper into utility-franchise regulation, a municipal government could, at some point, go too far in acting like a
utility without regulatory approval. As Franklin D. Roosevelt
recognized in his famous Portland Speech, there are many advantages to having a municipal government itself, rather than
an investor-owned utility, provide for energy supply and distri93
bution, directly setting retail rates for customers.s
Today,
more than 2,000 publicly owned utilities provide energy to
more than 14% of the U.S. population.19 4 Thirty of these municipal utilities serve populations of more than 100,000 in me192

See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Hydrofracking and Home Rule: Defending

and Defuning an Anti-Preemption Canon of Statutory Constructionin New York, 77

ALB. L. REV. 647, 656-57 (2013) (arguing that local land-use authority is too
important to be preempted by implication); Janice M. Schneider et al., The Future
of Siting and Building Energy Infrastructure,40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10363, 10367-69

(2010) (describing zoning challenges to siting energy facilities); Hannah Wiseman,
Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 494

(2011) ("With technical guidance, municipalities can effectively govern and enable
the siting of distributed renewables by modifying their zoning and building
codes.").

193

According to President Roosevelt:
[Where a community-a city or county or a district is not satisfied
with the service rendered or the rates charged by the private utility,
it has the undeniable basic right, as one of its functions of Government, one of its functions of home rule, to set up, after a fair referendum to its voters has been had, its own governmentally owned and
operated service. That right has been recognized in a good many of
the States of the Union. Its general recognition by every State will
hasten the day of better service and lower rates. It is perfectly clear
to me, and to every thinking citizen, that no community which is
sure that it is now being served well, and at reasonable rates by a
private utility company, will seek to build or operate its own plant.
But on the other hand the very fact that a community can, by vote of
the electorate, create a yardstick of its own, will, in most cases,
guarantee good service and low rates to its population. I might call
the right of the people to own and operate their own utility something like this: a "birch rod" in the cupboard to be taken out and
used only when the "child" gets beyond the point where a mere
scolding does no good.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address in Portland, Oregon on Public
Utilities and Development of Hydro-Electric Power (Sept. 21, 1932), http: / /www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88390what
194

See Am. PUB. POWER ASS'N, U.S.

[https://perma.cc/927Y-7MJA].

ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY STATISTICS 50

(2014), http://appanet.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/Directory/020-%20Statistical
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D78-9U5D].
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dium- to large-sized cities, including portions of Austin, Los
Angeles, Phoenix, Long Island, Nashville, Memphis, Jacksonville, Sacramento, Orlando, and Seattle, and hundreds of them
serve customers in smaller-sized cities and towns.19 5 Importantly, however, state laws require municipal governments that
wish to take public ownership of an existing energy system to
go through an extensive and burdensome regulatory process.
Even where a local government does not host its own municipal utility, and instead outsources its energy supply decisions to a private utility, it is increasingly rare today to see local
citizens indifferent to local policies related to energy affordability, reliability, and environmental protection. More
than three dozen municipal governments have exceeded state
renewable power goals and adopted their own 100% renewable
energy targets.1 9 6 Local governments' building efficiency incentives and enforcement strategies frequently result in energy
97
conservation and more efficient energy use than state law.1
These local green-building laws can translate into lower energy
costs, saving businesses money. Especially in states with high
energy costs, it is common for municipal governments to compete aggressively to attract and retain business customers, including offering incentives based on manufacturing output,
which also has the effect of providing at least some companies
195
196

Id. at 52-53.
See Lyndsey Gilpin, Large or Small, Cities' 100% Renewable Energy

Pledges Are More Than Symbolic, ENERGY NEWS NETwORK (May 22, 2017), http://

southeastenergynews.com/2017/05/22/large-or-small-cities- 100-renewableenergy-pledges-are-more-than-symbolic/ [https://perma.cc/ME5Q-SEWMI;
Projects in North America, Go 100% RENEWABLE ENERGY (Sept. 2018), http://

www.golOOpercent.org/cms/index.php?id=18/

[https://perma.cc/74FV-KA2D];

see also SIERRA CLUB, CmEs ARE READY FOR 100% CLEAN ENERGY: 10 CASE STUDIES 2

(2017), https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/ffiles/blog/RFOOCase-Studies-Cities-Report.pdf [https: / /perma.cc/V2H7-NBJG] (reporting on ten
U.S. cities and their commitment to using only renewable energy sources).
197 See Victor M. Hanna, Stop, Think, Build, Repeat: Using BehavioralEconomics to Better Design Energy Efficiency Policiesfor Our Cities'Buildings, 69 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 241, 288-89 (2014) (describing various local building initiatives in Califor-

nia and concluding that municipal governments are "better able to design policies
that meet the specific needs of their particular communities as compared to
federal or state authorities"); ELIZABETH DORRIS ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY

LAB., Energy Efficiency Policy in the United States: Overview of Trends at Different
Levels of Government (2009), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fylOosti/46532.pdf
[https: //perma.cc/333W-4UAZ (describing municipal as well as state and federal
building requirements). On how building code enforcement can produce revenue
for local governments, see LOUISE MOZINGO & ED ARENS, CTR. FOR RES. EFFICIENT
CMIYS. & CTR. FOR THE BUILT ENV'T, UNIV. OF CAL. AT BERKELY, QUANTIFYING THE
COMPREHENSIVE GREENHOUSE GAS Co-BENEFITS OF GREEN BUILDINGS 22-30 http://

ced.berkeley.edu/downloads/research/CREC-CBEFinalReport.pdf
perma.cc/8LAW-A5991.

[https://
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a discount from state-approved energy prices.19 8 If state rate

regulation were construed as field preemption of energy exactions, it would also threaten these kinds of local government
renewable power goals, energy efficiency standards, and economic development programs. Yet no one seriously suggests
that these kinds of initiatives are somehow preempted by state
law.
It is thus important to approach any implied preemption
analysis of exactions with care and not to allow it to categorically foreclose all local government initiatives that address energy prices. For this reason, local energy-exactions initiatives
need to be evaluated under the more nuanced analysis of obstacle and conflict preemption. A detailed examination of how
energy exactions relate to specific state laws and their purposes demonstrates that any intrastate preemption concerns
with energy exactions either misunderstand their scope and
role or are misplaced.
Consider too an "obstacle" preemption analysis. As an initial matter, assessing whether state-utility regulation presents
an obstacle to energy exactions requires articulating the regulatory objectives behind state-franchise regulation and retail
rate-setting laws.
Utility franchise regulation protects customers against
protracted distribution franchise battles that produce duplicative or unnecessary investments. To the extent a municipal
government requires all local landowners to pay fees based on
their energy use, invests this in city energy supply and distribution resources, and forecloses any landowner from purchasing energy from anyone but the local government, in effect it is
making a decision to operate as a municipal utility. 19 9 In order
for this kind of full municipalization to occur, state laws require
local governments to go through extensive regulatory approvals
198 Many municipal governments offer targeted tax credits, some of which are
tiered to manufacturer employee hiring and manufacturing outputs. See Louise
Story, As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High Price, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/us/how-local-taxpayers-

bankroll-corporations.html?pagewanted=all&mcubz=O [https://perma.cc/HU9H
-RQCM]. Some of these locally financed programs directly target high energy
prices. For example, New York City offers an Energy Cost Savings Program
(funded through property tax contributions to an Industrial and Commercial
Abatement Program) that offers businesses relocating to target areas of the city

45% savings from electricity prices and 35% savings from natural gas prices. See
N.Y.C. SMALL Bus. SERVS., SMALL BUSINESS INCENTIVE PROGRAMS, http://www.nyc.

gov/html/sbs/nycbiz/downloads/pdf/summary/incentives/businessincentives
pamphlet.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ36-GMEA].
199 For a discussion, see Welton, supra note 9, at 304-08 (discussing municipalization as a community's decision to forgo energy supply outsourcing).
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designed to minimize utility franchise disputes. 2 0 0 Local governments have always had the option of public ownership and
control of the energy system, but forming a municipal utility is
extremely expensive and can also prove difficult politically. 2 0 1
As we demonstrated above, 2 0 2 energy exactions offer local governments a much more modest option. Existing municipalization laws protect consumers from the harms of relentless
franchise battles and inefficient investments, but they do not
foreclose local governments from adopting a policy initiative
related to energy resources or local energy demand growth,
especially where an incumbent investor-owned utility has
failed to provide it.
Even if utility franchise regulation does not present a preemption problem, rate regulation could be invoked as a way of
challenging exaction fees. In setting just and reasonable retail
rates, utility regulators set a price for the retail sale of electricity. 2 03 By imposing an exaction on a subset of the utility's
customers, some might object that local land-use regulators
are supplementing rates with a fee that applies only to newcomers, which could potentially be construed as interfering
with uniform utility rates.
However, allowing for energy exaction fees for some customers against the backdrop of state rate regulation readily
survives an intrastate preemption analysis. Cost of service
ratemaking exists for two main reasons: (1) to compensate regulated utilities (allowing them to recover the capital infrastructure costs associated with providing service to customers) and
(2) to protect customers from unreasonable price discrimination, as occurs when a monopolist discounts one customer at
the cost of another similarly situated customer. Energy exactions are a supplement to rate regulation, and hence do not
present an obstacle to a utility recovering its reasonable costs
from its customers. Even with an exaction fee for some customers, the utility is still allowed to pass on all costs state
200 These state municipalization laws are designed to eliminate predatory
franchise conflicts over customers and to avoid duplicative and inefficient investment in energy supply and distribution infrastructure. For a survey of these laws,
see ABBY BRIGGERMAN ET AL., AM. PUB. POWER ASS'N, SURVEY OF STATE MUNICIPAUZA-

TION LAWS (2012), https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/
muncipalization-survey-of state_1aws.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2JW-JURK].
201
See Welton, supranote 9, at 289 (noting that in the 1990s many communities considered municipalization but that the barriers "proved too substantial for
most localities" because of utility opposition along with a legal requirement that
cities help fund previously incurred infrastructure costs).
202
See supra subpart II.A.
203 See supra subpart II.B.
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regulators have authorized, including customers who are subject to the fee. Nor do energy exactions facilitate the kinds of
discriminatory customer "discounts" or forms of predatory
pricing that rate regulation prohibits. A customer subject to an
energy exaction pays some fee to local land-use regulators on
top of its energy rates. Ultimately, the mere fact that one customer incurs greater costs than other customers is not determinative of a preemption filing under the filed rate doctrine,
which is concerned only with the prices a monopolist offers
similar customers. 2 04 Importantly, with energy exactions any
rents go to a municipal government, not a utility, which simply
places this concern beyond the focus of cost-of-service
ratemaking. To the extent any additive fees from energy exactions supplement existing utility rates, they do not introduce
the kinds of utility discounts or predatory pricing that harms
consumers.
At a more fundamental level, energy exactions do not set a
price for the sale of energy at all. Exactions are costs imposed
on developers as part of the development process-costs that
represent the increased burden on the electrical grid, but nevertheless are considered development costs, not energy costs.
And to the extent the exactions are effective at producing energy savings, this will not directly affect a utility's rates. Even
in the absence of energy exactions, someone can of course
choose to build a more efficient home, or can choose to conserve energy in many ways, without triggering any kind of preemption analysis based on utility ratemaking. The effect of
energy exactions on utility rates is no different.
In terms of conflict preemption, the argument that energy
exactions conflict with state utility regulation simply misses
the point of the regime we propose. State rate regulation could
conceivably present a clear conflict if a local government
capped state-approved utility rates or otherwise prohibited a
utility from recovering its costs for state-approved investments
in power plants. But an energy exaction (as we have argued, a
rent transfer to the local government) would not threaten the
financial viability of a state-regulated utility. 2 0 5 Energy exac204 See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield* Judicial Enforcementfor a
DeregulatoryEra, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1591, 1598-1601 (2003) (discussing how the
filed rate doctrine was originally intended to protect customers from unjust discrimination in pricing or service by a monopolist).
205 At the extreme, a significant loss of customers from a large metropolitan
area may leave a utility saddled with past state-approved infrastructure such as
an old nuclear or coal plant that no longer has economic value elsewhere on the
energy system. This parallels past arguments utilities have made regarding
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tions may help to keep local demand from growing, but this
merely represents the local government creating an energy conservation service that the incumbent utility has not made available under existing rate regulation. It does not impose any
additional financial cost on the utility or its other customers, so
energy exactions aimed at encouraging conservation do not
conflict with state regulation of utility rates.
Importantly, in some limited instances rate regulation already incorporates its own limited form of energy exactions,
albeit on a larger scale than any municipal government can
regulate. When it comes to power-distribution-line expansion,
state regulators often allow utilities to collect different amounts
from customers based on locational attributes (e.g., higher distribution line fees for rural customers as opposed to urban
ones). 2 0 6 But to see these kinds of expansion fees as conflicting
with local energy exactions also misunderstands how local en"stranded costs," which of course are difficult to disentangle from the ordinary
and political risks regulated firms always take on. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Since energy exactions present an opportunity for intergovernmental competition over rent extraction, they are best understood as political risks
that may at times also create new economic risks for incumbent utilities.
206 For example, in New York new customers meeting permanency requirements may receive up to 500 feet of single-phase or 300 feet of three-phase
overhead electric distribution line (along the road), per premises (tax parcel), free
of charge. In addition, residential customers may receive up to 100 feet of overhead electric service line (off road), per premises (tax parcel), free of charge, but
customers are assessed specific line fees for any additional distances. See Line
Extensions, N.Y. STATE ELEC. & GAS CORP., https://www.nyseg.com/wps/portal/

nyseg/home/tut/p/zO/fY9BT8MwDIV TYIZmNIO lbTBKooAyRElsvkNSbN lj
hdkhX49wSExAl8ePJ7sjLoEGBFpqcpeyCOFD8Vlv5pft-vZqhfebu8MH7G5WS
6fn-brZgEN6DKAf1 SNX4RZbFetBT IS7i-cvAZQNJHY6IxwfgvxmED lwTOoxHFy
HXsaf8j-nC5kdziddA26C5L5PYOSj8SWbNz9flFhz2Q4VkhdF86SKRhcmIr3J
dYEpHYiL7YHj4jotyobGksp5gPOrtg3-pPwEsfZDq/ [https://perma.cc/M2LRPUAM]. Other states outline specific fees for new customers. Arizona used to
allow free footage allowances and would give refunds to customers whose utility
connection required less than the allotted free amount. Due to growth in development, the refunds are now redistributed in helping new retail customers with line
extensions. See In re Application of Arizona Public Service Co.-Revised Line Extension Tariff Schedule 3, Nos. E-01345A-05-0816, E-01345A-05-0826, E0 1345A-05-0827 (ACC 2008). According to the 2007 California Integrated Energy
Policy Report, anyone building infrastructure outside a smart growth area must
pay the full price for any customer-specific distribution line extensions. See CAL.
ENERGY COMM'N, INTEGRATED ENERGY PoLIcY REPORT (2007), http://www.energy.ca.
gov/2007publications/CEC- 100-2007-008/CEC- 100-2007-008-CMF. PDF
[https://perma.cc/NV55-29DG]. Many utilities have had their specific line-extension fees approved in rates or tariffs on file with state regulators. For example,
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. has a set allowance for each new customer distribution
line investment (set by formula) and recovers any additional distribution line
costs from individual customers. See PAC. GAS AND ELEC. Co., ELECTRIC RULE No.
15: DISTRIBUTION LNE EXTENSIONS (2003), https://www.pge.com/tariffs/tm2/pdf/

ELECRULES_15.pdf [https://perma.cc/65NE-M8LB].
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ergy exactions may differ from broader customer expansion
exactions offered by utilities under state law. Even if a local
government were to impose local energy exactions to promote
demand reduction or new investments in power supply, higher
distribution line charges in state-regulated rates would continue to apply under state law. A utility would still be allowed
to recover its costs from more expensive new customers
through regulated rates. Local energy exactions would simply
supplement this by subjecting some customers to higher fees
for their increased impacts on the power system based on the
energy goals of the community in which they live.
As a generally matter, energy exactions should present no
serious intrastate preemption problem because this is a context in which some regulatory competition over customer energy resources is both appropriate and desirable. Recognizing
local land-use control over the energy demand and supply impacts of land use can produce valuable information and help
spark greater incentives for state regulators to consider this in
their energy policy decisions. Regardless of what state regulators do, it invites municipal governments to play an integral
role in energy planning without requiring them to take on the
significant financial obligation of operating its energy system as
a municipal utility. This should help to spark greater competition between local communities over energy incentives and basic values related to energy.
As energy markets expand to incorporate services such as
demand reduction, 2 0 7 municipal governments might also be
uniquely positioned to aggregate customer energy resources
and sell these in interstate energy markets. The very possibility of such a local government role should better encourage
utility regulators (at the state or local level) to integrate the
energy implications of various land uses, including demand
impacts, into their planning processes. Regardless of who takes
the initiative in recognizing opportunities for price discrimination and applying these exactions to energy rates, ongoing competition between state and local regulators over this energy
vision will encourage a more complete approach to utility planning that favors consideration of the system-wide energy im08
pacts of various land uses. 2
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
Of course, if state regulators were to incorporate their own exactions for
local development, with an aim to promote particular forms of energy conservation or energy supply, this would require a case-by-case assessment of conflict
preemption. We would not want our proposal to discourage states from adopting
207
208
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Consistent with discussions elsewhere in both environmental and energy law, another way of framing this intrastate
preemption argument is that, at most, it would constitute a
type of conflict preemption, where state law creates a floor for
the setting of energy rates (allowing, at a minimum, a utility to
recover its costs from customers) but does not impose a ceiling
that would prohibit the use of energy exactions to encourage
new forms of energy efficiency or decentralized power supply. 2 0 9 State law would still set the utility's minimum rate level
and, in rate allocation, protect customers against discriminatory prices (including predatory pricing), but state-utility regulation should not hamstring additional local clean energy
innovations. In a similar manner, under the statute authorizing adoption of California's new solar mandate-a statewide
type of energy exaction-municipal governments are allowed to
adopt more stringent local requirements so long as these are
cost effective and do not increase a building's net energy consumption. 2 10 Treating state utility law, including rate setting,
as a regulatory floor encourages local governments to become
partners with state regulators in pursuing new experiments to
promote energy conservation and clean energy supply.
C.

Takings and Unconstitutional Conditions

For state-utility regulators setting customer rates, the U.S.
Constitution's Takings Clause provides few constraints. Since
the New Deal, courts have consistently subjected utility ratesetting decisions (including decisions regarding the allocation
of costs among customers) to a fairly deferential standard of
constitutional review. 2 1 1 An energy utility has significant incentives to provide information to regulators on an ongoing
these approaches and hope that it would create better information and greater
incentives for a state regulator to do so.
209

Cf Jim Rossi, The Brave New Pathof Energy Federalism, 95 TEx. L. REV.

399, 451-54 (2016) (arguing for a similar form of floor preemption under federal
energy statutes); Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean
Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. REv. 1283, 1287 (2013) (arguing for a "clean energy
floor" as a method of preemption).
210

See CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, LOCAL ORDINANCES EXCEEDING THE 2016 BUILDING

ENERGY EFFICIENCY STANDARDS, https://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/2016stand

ards/ordinances/ [https://perma.cc/2F46-QP7K](noting that local governments
may adopt more stringent standards, subject to approval by state regulators).
211 In a landmark 1944 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a deferential approach to reviewing utility rates under the U.S. Constitution. See Fed.
Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602-03, 615-19 (1944).
The Supreme Court's most recent decision on this issue continued with a deferential approach to reviewing a takings challenge to rates, upholding a regulator's
utility rate determinations so long as the end result is just and reasonable and the
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basis to correct for any failure to recover costs. Too, utility
investor sophistication and portfolio diversity makes any harm
that does occur due to ratemaking look more like an ordinary
business risk, not a constitutional injury. Any expectationbased interests of investors are typically considered beyond
any meaningful review by courts, since they are likely to be
protected in the political process of ratemaking. 2 12
By contrast, energy exactions implicate a distinct doctrinal
line of case law involving the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The application of this doctrine to exactions is contested
and in flux, but is governed by a trio of cases: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 2 13 Dolan v. City of Tigard,2 1 4 and
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District.2 15 Together, these cases establish that any development exactions
must be sufficiently related to, and proportional to, the underlying justification for the exaction.
Broadly speaking, Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz, and application of the unconstitutional takings doctrine, can be understood as limiting unduly burdensome exactions that impose
significant costs on a few without producing commensurate
benefits. 2 16 In Nollan, the Supreme Court struck down an effort by the California Coastal Commission to condition redevelopment of a beachfront lot on the property owner dedicating
land for a public right-of-way along the ocean. 2 1 7 The Court
reasoned that such development conditions must be related to,
or have an "essential nexus" to, the impacts of the proposed
development 2 1 8 -a requirement that, much like the cost causation principle in utility ratemaking, 2 19 aims to impose addifirm remains viable for future investors. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488
U.S. 299, 315-16 (1989).
212
For discussion of the contrast between judicial approaches to constitutional review of utility ratemaking versus local land use regulation, see Susan
Rose-Ackerman
1435, 1441-57
213
483 U.S.
214
512 U.S.

& Jim Rossi, DisentanglingDeregulatoryTakings, 86 VA. L. REV.
(2000).
825 (1987).
374 (1994).

570 U.S. 595 (2013).
See, e.g., Christina M. Martin, Nollan and Dolan and Koontz-Oh Myl The
Exactions Trilogy Requires Developers to Cover the Full Social Costs of Their
215
216

Projects, But No More, 51 WIuAMETrE L. REv. 39, 41 (2014) (identifying "basic

ideas" from the trio of cases as including "(1) the government should not be able to
use land-use laws and permit applications to coerce landowners into giving the
government what it would otherwise have to pay for; and (2) the government may
legitimately require landowners to carry their own weight, mitigating their development plans so that landowners do not impose costs on their neighbors").
217
218
219

483 U.S. at 843.

See id. at 837.
See supra subpart II.B.
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tional costs on those who stand to benefit from new
investment.
In Dolan, the Supreme Court struck down a condition imposed by the city on the granting of a permit to expand a hardware store, requiring the property owner to dedicate land for a
public bike path, among other things. 2 2 0 The Court held that
while the bike path did bear an essential nexus to the impact of
increased traffic from the store expansion, the government nevertheless bears an additional burden of demonstrating that its
demand is in "rough proportionality" to that impact. 2 2 1 Because the city did not produce any evidence demonstrating how
much the bike path would offset the increased traffic, the condition was unconstitutional. 2 2 2 Dolan's proportionality requirement helps to ensure that when municipal governments
do impose exactions, those costs have some rough proportionality to the burdens being offset-another parallel to utility
ratemaking's cost causation principle. 2 2 3
Finally, in Koontz the Court resolved two outstanding questions, holding that the Nollan/Dolan framework applies to
monetary exactions as well as to demands for land, 2 2 4 and that
it applies even where the government ultimately denies the
permit because the property owner did not accede to the demands, i.e., to so-called "failed exactions." 2 2 5 Under this
framework then, an exaction must be both related to, and
roughly proportional to, the expected impact of the development, and this requirement applies also to demands for
money.2 2 6
The requirements of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz are relatively rigorous in contrast to the kind of deference to regulators
512 U.S. at 379.
.at 391.
222
Id. at 396-97.
223
See supranotes 129-34 and accompanying text.
224
See 570 U.S. at 612.
225
See ic. at 607. For analysis of this case, see John D. Echeverria, The Costs
of Koontz, 39 VT. L. REv. 573, 574-86 (2015) (criticizing Koontz and contending
that the Court's holdings "represent incoherent departures from prior precedent
and established doctrine"). See also Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Pefialver,
Exactions Creep, 2013 Sup. CT. REV. 287, 297-99 (summarizing the Court's holdings and reasoning); Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1660-62 (2015) (describing Koontz and its holding); Sean F.
Nolon, Bargainingfor Development Post-Koontz: How the Supreme Court Invaded
Local Government, 67 FA. L. REv. 171, 188-92 (2015) ("Now physical, monetary,
imposed, and proposed conditions must meet the nexus and rough proportionality requirements.").
226
See 570 U.S. at 597.
220

221 I
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that utility rate regulation has received. 2 2 7 Analogous state
laws sometimes make them even more so. 2 2 8 Still, these doctrines leave plenty of room for the traditional use of exactions to
force developers to pay for, or otherwise mitigate, the adverse
impacts of a proposed development. Exactions that require
developers to compensate for the marginal effects of their development on municipal infrastructure will withstand constitutional scrutiny so long as the government can make an
adequate showing of proportionality. 2 2 9 Properly interpreted,
this trio of cases should not prohibit the energy exactions that
we propose-and satisfying their requirements may even help
to better align them with the goals of marginal cost pricing.
Fundamentally, this entire area of law responds broadly to
the concern that local governments can, and sometimes in extreme cases do, impose excessive and extreme exactions and
can constitute rent seeking that is harmful to both property
owners and social welfare. 23 0 The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine aims squarely at the concern that exactions might be
used to extract exorbitant rents from the few to produce unrelated, sometimes obscured benefits that citizens are unable to
monitor in local voting and political processes. 2 3 1 In fact, if
227
See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text (contrasting judicial review of rate regulation).
228
See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 34, at 736 (describing state court review of
exactions).
229
See, e.g., Herron v. Mayor & City Council of Annapolis, 388 F. Supp. 2d
565, 570-71 (D. Md. 2005), affd sub nom. Herron v. Mayor & City Council, 198 F.
App'x 301 (4th Cir. 2006) (upholding as proportional an impact fee ordinance that
collected and distributed funds on a district-wide basis); Ocean Harbor House
Homeowners Ass'n v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 446-50 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (finding a mitigation fee to be proportional to the loss of beach that
would result from granting a seawall construction permit); Dowerk v. Charter
Twp. of Oxford, 592 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) ("[W]e conclude that
conditioning the development of a subdivision on upgrading the existing private
road that would provide the development's only access to public highways ...
imposes a burden that is in at least 'rough proportion' to the increased traffic and
public safety concerns that would follow from the proposed development.");
Sparks v. Douglas Cty., 904 P.2d 738, 745-46 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (conditioning approval of plat applications upon dedication of rights of way for road improvements was proportional to the increased traffic a development would cause).
230

See Martin, supra note 216, at 41 (stating that Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz

recognize that "the government should not be able to use land-use laws and
permit applications to coerce landowners into giving the government what it
would otherwise have to pay for. . . ").
231
See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 606 ("Our precedents thus enable permitting au-

thorities to insist that applicants bear the full costs of their proposals while still
forbidding the government from engaging in 'out-and-out . .. extortion' that would
thwart the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation." (alteration in original)
(quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837)); see also WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, REGUIATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLrICS 139 (1995) (arguing
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priced too high, exactions allow a local government to expropriate surplus value from a developer for reasons that have little
connection to a use of land. Nevertheless, energy exactions
should not violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, at
least if properly implemented.
As a preliminary matter, it is an open question whether the
Nollan/Dolan/Koontz trio even applies to legislated exactions. 232 According to one reading of Dolan, the constitutional
harm animating this entire area of law comes from singling-out
an individual property owner for an extortionate demand. 233
Backroom deals with opaque negotiations are particularly ripe
for abusive demands, and so are subject to especially searching
review. Arguably, however, the same is not true of legislative
exactions with pre-specified prices. If developers are on notice
ahead of time of the prices they will be expected to pay, concerns about excessive or extortionate demands largely disappear. Several courts have, indeed, held that the Nollan/Dolan
framework does not apply to legislative exactions at all. 2 3 4 If
this approach were to prevail, courts would have little business
in policing how energy exactions are set.
that owners of undeveloped land have less political power and therefore require
greater constitutional protection against land-use regulations); Alan Romero, Two
Constitutional Theories for Invalidating Extortionate Exactions, 78 NEB. L. REV.
348, 371-72 (1999) (suggesting less political accountability exists in the context
of exactions). But see Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 VT. L. REv. 623, 647
(2012) (suggesting that "political accountability" may constrain the use of
exactions).
232
David L. Callies, Through a Glass Clearly: Predicting the Futurein Land Use
Takings Law, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 48 (2014) (identifying issue as unresolved).
233 See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 460 (Cal. 1996)
(holding that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to legislative exactions); Ball & Reynolds, supra note 38, at 1519-20 (arguing there is no exception for legislative
exactions); id. at 1561-68 (describing law and citing cases addressing the legislative-adjudicative distinction); Laurie Reynolds, Local Subdivision Regulation: Formulaic Constraints in an Age of Discretion, 24 GA. L. REv. 525, 544-49 (1990)
(arguing that the distinction itself is meaningless in the context of local governments); see also J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the "EssentialNexus": How
State and FederalCourts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should
Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 373, 375 (2002) ("This Article contends that
courts misread Nollan and Dolan and undermine the purposes of the Takings
Clause when they hold that the essential nexus does not apply to monetary or
legislative exactions."). For a thorough review of the literature and a summary of
the debate, see Mulvaney, supranote 18, at 146-51. See also Fenster, supra note
34, at 745-46 (describing the imperfections of Nollan/Dolan).
234
See, e.g., St. Clair Cty. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Pell City, 61 So. 3d
992, 1007 (Ala. 2010) (finding that Dolan is not applicable to legislative enactments); Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993,
1000 (Ariz. 1997) (distinguishing Nollan/Dolan); Greater Atlanta Homebuilders
Ass'n v. DeKalb Cty., 588 S.E.2d 694, 697 (Ga. 2003) (finding the appellants' use
of Dolan unpersuasive).
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Other courts, however, disagree and apply these doctrines
in a way that subjects local land-use exactions to relatively
rigorous judicial scrutiny. Several courts have reasoned that
the underlying harm is the substance of the demand itself and
that both legislative and negotiated exactions are subject to
Nollan/Dolan analysis.2 3 5 The doctrinal issue remains unresolved. It is therefore important to consider how the unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies specifically to energy
exactions-a question that may require careful factual assessment of not only how the level of the costs of energy exactions
compares to the benefits, but who bears the costs and who
benefits.
Superficially, the Nollan/Dolan issues appear simple
enough. So long as a municipality can demonstrate that it is
pricing energy exactions consistently with our proposal and
charging developers no more than the marginal impact of the
development on energy infrastructure, the exactions will be
both related to, and proportional to, the burdens created by the
development. The problem becomes more complex, however,
with the recognition that the burdens of development on energy
infrastructure are not necessarily burdens that the municipality will bear. The possibility of a jurisdictional mismatch between the municipality exercising land-use control and the
utility providing energy to the development makes the analysis
considerably more difficult.
There is only a possible mismatch, however, because in
many areas of the country customers are not served by a private utility but by a "municipal utility," which owns distribution wires. 2 3 6 Beyond the distribution and retail sale of energy,
many municipal power utilities also own generation and trans-

235 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders of U.S. v. Chesterfield Cty., 907 F.
Supp. 166, 168-69 (E.D. Va. 1995) (applying the "rough proportionality" test to a
legislative cash proffer policy), affd, 92 F.3d 1180 (4th Cir. 1996); N. Ill. Home
Builders Ass'n v. Cty. of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 388-89 (Ill. 1995) (analyzing
whether ordinances passed pursuant to state enabling acts comport with Nollan
and Dolan); Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390-91 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995) ("Certainly, a municipality should not be able to insulate itself from
a takings challenge merely by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen's property."); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd.,
135 S.W.3d 620, 641 (Tex. 2004) ("While we recognize that an ad hoc decision is

more likely to constitute a taking than general legislation, we think it entirely
possible that the government could 'gang up' on particular groups to force extractions that a majority of constituents would not only tolerate but applaud, so long
as burdens they would otherwise bear were shifted to others.").
236 For discussion, see supra notes 193-195 and accompanying text.
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mission.2 37 Where a municipal utility provides both power generation and distribution to customers in a municipality, the
burdens of local development on energy supply are, in effect, no
different from the burdens on public schools or other municipal services. In the absence of energy exactions, the costs of
adding capacity to the system to meet new demand will be
borne by the municipality one way or another. Shifting these
costs to the developer is precisely the use of exactions that
Nollan and Dolan contemplate and allow.
The analysis will be different where a private utility services multiple jurisdictions. AEP, for example, is an investorowned utility that serves electric customers in many municipalities in the Appalachian area. 238 Today, without any action
on the part of a municipal government, significant growth in
Roanoke, Virginia could require AEP to make new investments
in energy supply, and those costs would then be spread regionally among the rate-paying customer-both within and outside
of Roanoke. Put differently, existing customers in Roanoke do
not bear the full costs of those investments, because some of
them can be spread to customers in areas with declining populations, such as Charleston, West Virginia. In effect, without
any attention to energy by a municipality, some of the marginal
costs of new development on energy supply and infrastructure
can be externalized to customers in other municipalities.
In contrast, the costs of energy exactions are borne by
developers, while the benefits are captured entirely by the local
government even as the full costs of increased energy demand
are shared more broadly. For example, under the hypothetical
pricing proposed above, a new development creating 200,000
kWh of new energy demand will require the payment of a
$200,000 exaction to the local government, even though the
costs of meeting that new demand will be borne partly by customers in other municipalities. 2 3 9 These new revenues captured by the local government enable the community to pursue
its own energy vision, though at the same time energy-system
237
More than 500 municipal utilities own 5 megawatts or more of power
generation. See Am. PUB. POWER ASs'N, supra note 194, at 62. Municipal utilities
provide 10% of the national power supply capacity and, together with rural cooperatives and federal power agencies (such as the Tennessee Valley Authority),
"public power" generation capacity exceeds 20% of total U.S. power supply. Id. at
56.
238
AEP Service Territories, AM. ELEC. POWER, https://www.aepnationalac
counts.com/info/facts/serviceterritory.aspx [https://perma.cc/8AH3-J68P] (last
visited Sept. 26, 2018).
239
See supra subpart II.A.
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costs embedded in utility rates might be borne by customers
elsewhere who can no longer depend on that municipality's
customer growth to subsidize a utility's rents. 2 4 0 In this sense,
exactions present a classic jurisdictional mismatch: Parochial
imposition of energy exactions can create significant benefits
(in terms of promoting grid reliability and addressing problems
such as climate change) while also imposing impacts on customers beyond a municipality's jurisdictional footprint. In
other words, the amount of the exaction may not be proportional to the local costs of increased energy demand.
As a doctrinal matter, however, it seems doubtful that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine constrains governments
to consider only local effects in pursuing their energy values.
The requirements of Nollan are easily met to the extent that
energy exactions are related to the customer energy demand
imposed by new development. It is Dolan's proportionality requirement that proves more difficult, but Dolan itself is cryptic
about the burdens to which the proportionality requirement
applies. After distinguishing both more restrictive and more
lax approaches to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in
state courts, the Supreme Court in Dolan adopted what it
called an intermediate approach, requiring that "the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development." 2 4 1 That holding does not
say that the exaction must be related to the local impact of the
development and so does not appear to restrict exactions to
address only localized burdens. In fact, one part of the exaction at issue in Dolan was a required dedication of a greenway
for purposes of flood control along the Fanno Creek Basin. 2 4 2
The Fanno Creek is approximately 15 miles long and passes
through Beaverton, Durham and some unincorporated areas
in addition to Tigard, which had sought to impose the develop240
The problem persists even if developers minimize energy demands so as to
minimize the extent of the energy exaction. At the extreme end, if a developer
creates its own solar generation facility to create a truly net-zero project, the
benefits are externalized to ratepayers in other municipalities who therefore do
not have to bear a share of the cost of meeting the demand that otherwise would
have increased.
241
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
242
See id. at 388-89 ("The city required that petitioner dedicate 'to the City as
Greenway all portions of the site that fall within the existing 100-year floodplain
[of Fanno Creek] . . . and all property 15 feet above [the floodplain] boundary.'"
(alterations in original) (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 439 n.3 (Or.
1993) (en banc))).
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ment exactions. 243 Preventing flooding on the Fanno Creek
would therefore have created benefits (or prevented future
harms) beyond the borders of Tigard. In striking down the
exaction, the Court criticized the absence of any finding by the
government about how a greenway would impact flooding. 244
The Court did not, however, indicate or imply that the extraterritorial benefits of flood control were a problem for the exaction
or a limitation on the proportionality requirement. The energy
exactions we propose will be related to the overall energy burdens of new development. If Dolarf's requirement of rough proportionality does not mandate a jurisdictional fit, then there is
no constitutional problem.
In this regard, energy exactions actually resemble conventional exactions for new development's transportation burdens.
Municipalities will often impose impact fees or other forms of
exactions to address traffic congestion or the burden of new
development on mass transit.2 45 Upgrades to roads, intersections, or bus stops are familiar uses of municipal exactions. 246
Of course, large-scale new development will often have regionwide impacts on transportation, and yet local governments can
protect their parochial interests by improving local conditions
while ignoring those regional costs. In other words, local governments can, without offending Nollan or Dolan, address local
infrastructure burdens even if there are additional regional
ones. Transportation infrastructure is admittedly different
from the energy grid because traffic congestion is most acute
near the development. The intensity of the infrastructure bur243 About the Watershed, Cny OF PORTLAND, OR., http://www.porlandore
gon.gov/BES/57717 [https://perma.cc/D5JK-42XR] (last visited Oct. 6, 2016).

244 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393 ("It is difficult to see why recreational visitors
trampling along petitioner's floodplain easement are sufficiently related to the
city's legitimate interest in reducing flooding problems along Fanno Creek, and
the city has not attempted to make any individualized determination to support
this part of its request.").
245

See, e.g., Impact Fees: Development Impact Fees, S.F. PLANNING DEP'T, http:/

/sf-planning.org/impact-fees [https://perma.cc/6EQN-UA2V] (describing transit
impact fees in San Francisco).
246
See, e.g., SARA J. HENDRICKS & CECILIA DYHOUSE, CTR. FOR URB. TRANsP. RES.,
LAND DEVELOPER PARTICIPATION IN PROVIDING FOR Bus TRANSIT FACILITIES AND OPERA-

TIONS iv (2002), https://depts.washington.edu/trac/concurrency/pdf/hen
dricks.pdf [https://perma.cc/US5N-AEQHI ("[Ilmpact fees are an available tool to
secure transportation capital funds specifically resulting from land development
activities."); CITY OF SANTA MONICA, TRANSPORTATION IMPACT FEE NExus STUDY (April

2012), https://www.smgov.net/uploadedFiles/Departments/PCD/Transporta
tion/Developers/Santa-Monica-Nexus-Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3JF-VJ7V]
(providing data justifying imposition of impact fees for transportation burdens);
see also Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 205 n. 100 (listing transit and transportation
as common uses of impact fees).
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dens decreases with distance. Not so with energy, where the
burdens of new development within the municipality imposing
the exaction are no different-either in kind or in degree-from
the burdens in other municipalities within a utility's service
area. Nevertheless, there is nothing about the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine that should prevent a local government
from exacting the local costs of meeting energy demand, even if
there are additional regional costs that remain unaffected.
Normatively, this is the right answer. As noted above,
under the default approach to energy planning, many of the
costs of a local development's increased energy demand are
borne regionally, including by some nonlocal customers. It
would be a perverse constitutional rule that prevents a local
government from addressing externalized costs by requiring a
narrow, blinkered focus on only the local effects of development. If, in solving local problems, a municipality also addresses regional costs, that should not violate the "rough
proportionality" required by Dolan.
Local governments can be further protected from a Dolan
challenge if they require that any money received from an energy exaction regime be used to offset energy demands elsewhere in the municipality. Indeed, this is not only helpful for
constitutional purposes; it reinforces the normative goal of reducing energy demand broadly. Otherwise, a municipality
might just be profiting from the existence of the externalized
costs of new energy demand instead of actually addressing it.
Our ultimate objective in proposing municipal energy exactions
is to reduce or eliminate the net increase in energy demand
from new development. That can be done to a large extent onsite by implementing energy saving designs and technologies.
But it can also be done off-site by using any exacted money to
promote local energy savings. Exactions, for example, could be
placed into a fund used to retrofit municipal buildings, to subsidize (through loans or grants) private investments in energy
savings, or to develop community solar facilities, among many
other options. 2 4 7
These uses of exacted money are, of course, consistent
with the values and policy preferences that would lead a municipality to adopt energy exactions in the first place. But they
also help to satisfy the Dolan requirements by minimizing or
even preventing net increase in energy demand from the municipality. Exactions are proportional to the energy burdens
247
See Kingsley, supra note 18, at 533 (proposing that money from "green
building" impact fees be used to subsidize additional green building).
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that a development imposes on a municipality if they allow a
local government to preserve status quo energy demand by offsetting those burdens elsewhere. 2 4 8
This addresses the interlocal concern about a jurisdictional mismatch between the collection of impact fees by a local
government while the burdens of new energy demand are
shared regionally. If the local government collecting the fees
uses the money to net out the marginal increase in energy
demand, then there will be no increased burden on the energy
system as a whole. Extraterritorial energy consumers will not
face rising rates, and the energy exaction-properly pricedwill instead ensure that new development imposes no new energy system costs at all. That is, at least, the ultimate goal of
the proposal.
CONCLUSION

We have shown how energy exactions present land-use
regulators with an opportunity to capture a portion of the rents
that traditional state-utility regulation bestows upon a private
investor-owned utility. Rather than encouraging local governments to outsource energy supply and vesting exclusive control
over every community's energy vision with a state-centered regulator, local energy exactions can produce valuable information about customer energy demand and its alternatives,
diversify risks in energy infrastructure investment, and promote intergovernmental competition for the provision of underfunded public goods related to a community's energy future,
including grid reliability and carbon reduction.
As land-use regulators endorse energy exactions, the possibility of new forms of rent-seeking should not be overlooked.
But neither can we ignore how the conventional state utilityplanning and rate-setting process often produces concentrated
benefits for the few at the expense of the many, or how it has
done a poor job of encouraging demand reduction, distributed
energy supply, and a resilient energy grid. Our analysis of the
problem suggests that land-use regulation is perfectly positioned to supplement traditional utility regulation. Rather
248
This goal of limiting new energy demand is entirely consistent with the
commitments many local governments have made to continue to abide by the
requirements of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. See, e.g., Hiroko
Tabuchi & Henry Fountain, Bucking 7ump, These Cities, States and Companies
Commit to ParisAccord, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2017, at A12, https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/06/01/climate/american-cities-climate-standards.html [https://
perma.ce/TFM8-YXR7] (describing, inter alia, cities' commitments to abide by
Paris Agreement).
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than the current default approach-which outsources local energy needs to a private utility operating across multiple communities and managed by a state regulator-energy law should
encourage each locality to focus on how its own management
and uses of land impact the energy system. In sum, energy
exactions provide a unique, pragmatic, and valuable opportunity to integrate local community values into planning discussions concerning the energy grid, promoting demand
reduction, and inviting new investments in low-carbon energy
infrastructure.
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